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I. Introduction
The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) was passed with
bipartisan support in 1990 with the stated purpose of protecting
individuals from disability based discrimination.1 One of the specific
goals of the ADA was to ensure economic self-sufficiency for disabled
individuals, and Title I of the ADA prohibits employment
discrimination against “qualified individuals with…disabilities.”2
Despite the initial high hopes of disability rights activists, as a result
of restrictive court decisions, the ADA was largely unsuccessful in
prohibiting discrimination against individuals with disabilities.3
On September 25, 2008, the Americans with Disabilities Act
Amendments Act (ADAAA) was unanimously approved by both
houses of Congress4 and signed into law by President George W.
Bush.5 The ADAAA specifically overturned four Supreme Court
decisions that had narrowly defined the term disability under the
ADA. One of Congress’ main objectives in enacting the ADAAA was
to turn the focus of ADA cases away from the definition of disability
and instead refocus these cases on the issue of discrimination.6 The
expanded definition of disability has led to this objective being met
and courts in Title I cases are now more likely to grapple with the
question of whether disabled employees are discriminated against in
the workplace.
1.

Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (2012). See
also Stephen F. Befort, An Empirical Examination of Case Outcomes
Under the ADA Amendments Act, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2027, 2027
(2013).

2.

Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (2012) (“No
covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual on the
basis of disability in regard to job application procedures, the hiring,
advancement or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job
trainings, and other terms, conditions and privileges of employment.”).
Id. at § 12111 (2012) (stating that the ADA applies to private
employers with 15 or more employees, employment agencies, labor
organizations, and management committees).

3.

See Robert L. Burgdorf Jr., Restoring the ADA and Beyond: Disability
in the 21st Century, 13 TEX. J.C.L. & C.R. 241, 242 n. 2 (2008) (noting
the significant amount of literature “devoted to defending, criticizing,
and analyzing the [ADA]”); see also generally Ruth Colker, The
Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfall for Defendants, 34 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99, 110–16 (1999) (stating that contrary to popular
belief the ADA has not created a windfall for plaintiffs).

4.

154 CONG. REC. S8342 (daily ed. Sept. 11, 2008); 154 CONG. REC. H8298
(daily ed. Sept. 17, 2008).

5.

Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No.
110-325, (122 Stat.) 3553 (2008).

6.

Befort, supra note 1, at 2029.
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The ADA and the ADAAA apply to both physical and mental
illness and an identical framework is used in analyzing claims of
disability discrimination in the workplace regardless of whether the
employee has a physical or mental disability. However, there are a
number of ways in which mental illness is generally different than
physical illness, and there are a number of unique hurdles faced by
mentally ill employees in ADA and ADAAA litigation. These hurdles
stem both from actual limitations associated with mental illness as
well as from stereotypes and stigmas that society has about mentally
ill individuals.
This Article will examine how the ADAAA has impacted and will
likely continue to impact employees with mental illness in the
workplace. The Article will address both the ways in which the
broadened definition of disability under the ADAAA has expanded
protection for mentally ill employees in the workplace, as well as the
hurdles that are still faced by employees who suffer from mental
illness. While the expanded definition of disability under the ADAAA
has removed one significant hurdle, the ADAAA failed to make other
necessary statutory amendments and as a result, many mentally ill
employees continue to have difficulty establishing a prima facie case
of disability discrimination under the ADAAA.
Part II of the Article will provide a brief background on the ADA
and discuss the Supreme Court decisions that narrowly interpreted
the ADA. Part III of this Article will address the differences between
mental illness and physical illness, highlighting some of the unique
aspects of mental illness. This Part will also discuss the various
stereotypes and stigmas surrounding mental illness. Part IV will
examine the ways in which the ADAAA has expanded the definition
of disability under the Act, and how the expanded definition has
impacted mentally ill employees in the workplace. Part V will then
address the hurdles that mentally ill employees still face under the
ADAAA. The Article concludes that while the ADAAA’s expanded
definition of disability has helped mentally ill employees in the
workplace, many employees still face difficulty in establishing a prima
facie case of disability discrimination and demonstrating that they
suffered discrimination because of their disability.
II. The ADA
This Part provides a brief background on the history and terms of
the original version of the ADA, which was passed by Congress in
1990. It also discusses the Supreme Court cases that narrowly
interpreted the ADA and were the impetus for Congress unanimously
passing the ADAAA in 2008. In doing so, this Part provides the
background for why Congress enacted the ADAAA.
A. Overview of the ADA
The ADA was passed with bipartisan support in 1990, with the
stated purpose of protecting individuals with disabilities from
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disability based discrimination.7 One of the specific goals of the ADA
was to ensure economic self-sufficiency for disabled individuals and
Title I of the ADA prohibits employment discrimination against
“qualified individuals with…disabilities.”8 Despite initial high hopes of
disability rights activists, the ADA was largely unsuccessful in
prohibiting disability based discrimination.9
While the ADA is civil rights legislation that is aimed at
protecting individuals with disabilities from discrimination in a
manner similar to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,10 it also
differs in two important ways from Title VII.11 First, Title VII
prohibits discrimination “because of” certain protected categories.12
In other words, it protects all people from discrimination based on
protected categories such as “sex” or “race,” and plaintiffs do not
need to prove that they have a “sex” or a “race.” The ADA, on the
other hand only protects individuals who meet the statutory
definition of “disability” under the Act.
Second, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in general only prohibits
discrimination and does not affirmatively mandate accommodation.13
The ADA, however, includes an affirmative requirement of
accommodation and looks at whether an employee is qualified for the
job either “with or without a reasonable accommodation.”14 Such
accommodation is mandated under the ADA unless it would impose
an “undue hardship” on the employer.15 The ADA therefore treats
disability differently than most protected categories under Title VII,
but similarly to how Title VII treats religion, since reasonable
7.

42 U.S.C. § 12112 (2012). See also Befort, supra note 1; Lorraine
Schmall, One Step Closer to Mental Health Parity, 9 NEV. L.J. 646, 64950 (2009).

8.

Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (2012) (“No
covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual on the
basis of disability in regard to job application procedures, the hiring,
advancement or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job
trainings, and other terms, conditions and privileges of employment.”).

9.

See Colker, supra note 3, at 160.

10.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012).

11.

Befort supra note 1, at 2033.

12.

Chai R. Feldblum, Kevin Berry & Emily A Benfer, The ADA
Amendments Act of 2008, 13 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 187, 187 (2008).

13.

Befort, supra note 1, at 2033. See also Matthew Diller, Judicial
Backlash and the ADA, and the Civil Rights Model, 21 BERKELEY J.
EMP. & LAB. L. 19, 43 (2000).

14.

Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §12111(8) (2012).

15.

Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A)
(2012).
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accommodation of religious employees is mandated by Title VII.16
In order to establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination
under Title I of the ADA a plaintiff must show that he “(1) [is] a
disabled person as defined by the ADA; (2) is qualified, with or
without a reasonable accommodation, to perform the essential
functions of the job held or desired; and (3) suffered discrimination by
an employer or prospective employer because of that disability.”17
Prior to the passage of the ADAAA, the largest hurdle faced by
plaintiffs in ADA cases was demonstrating that they met the first
prong of the prima facie case, which is satisfying the statutory
definition of disability. The ADA states that an individual is disabled
if he has “(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially
limits one or more major life activities…; (B) a record of such an
impairment; or (C) [is] regarded as having such an impairment.”18
Courts had interpreted the term “disabled” so narrowly that the
majority of plaintiffs were unable to show that they met the statutory
definition of “disabled.”19 In most pre-ADAAA cases, the issue was
not whether the plaintiff suffered from an impairment, but rather
whether the impairment substantially limited a major life activity. In
narrowly interpreting the ADA, lower courts found that plaintiffs who
suffered from diseases including cancer, multiple dystrophy, epilepsy,
and depression were not disabled.20
B. Supreme Court Decisions Narrowly Interpreting the ADA
Two Supreme Court cases in particular significantly narrowed the
definition of disability and directly led to the eventual passage of the

16.

Section 701(j) of the 1964 Civil Rights Act requires employers to
“reasonably accommodate” an employee’s religious beliefs and practices
unless doing so would cause “undue hardship on the conduct of the
employer’s business.”42 U.S.C. § 2000e (j) (2012). The United States
Supreme Court has narrowly defined “undue hardship” as any cost
greater than de minimis. See TWA, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84
(1977) (the United States Supreme Court defined “undue hardship” as
any cost greater than de minimis). However, despite this narrow
interpretation there are lower courts that require a more meaningful
level of accommodation. See generally Debbie N. Kaminer, Title VII’s
Failure to Provide Meaningful and Consistent Protection of Religious
Employees: Proposals for an Amendment, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB.
L. 575, 579 (2000).

17.

E.E.O.C. v. Picture People, Inc., 684 F.3d 981, 985 (10th Cir. 2012).

18.

42 U.S.C. § 12102(1) (2012).

19.

See generally Befort, supra note 1, at 2037-39; Schmall, supra note 7, at
650-51; James Concannon, Mind Matters: Mental Disability and the
History and Future of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 36 LAW &
PSYCHOL. REV. 89, 99-103 (2012).

20.

Schmall, supra note 7, at 650-51; Colker, supra note 3, at 110-16.
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ADAAA.21 In Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., the Court affirmed
the judgment of the Tenth Circuit and held that when making a
determination as to whether an individual is disabled under the ADA,
the individual’s disability should be examined in its mitigated state.22
The plaintiffs in Sutton were sisters who suffered from severe myopia,
but had 20/20 vision with corrective lenses.23 They were denied
positions as pilots at United Airlines since the company required
pilots to have uncorrected vision of at least 20/100.24 The Sutton
Court determined the plaintiffs were not “disabled” under the ADA,
since their eyesight was normal in its mitigated state.25
The Sutton Court also held that the plaintiffs were not “regarded
as” disabled under the third prong of the ADA’s definition of
disability since they were only unable to work in the specific job of
airline pilot.26 According to the Court, a plaintiff would need to show
that her employer perceived her impairment as substantially limiting
a major life activity. The plaintiffs in Sutton had argued that their
employer regarded them as substantially limited in the major life
activity of working. However, the Court dismissed this argument
since the employees were not perceived as unable to work in a broad
class of jobs but rather only in the specific job of airline pilot.
The Supreme Court further narrowed the definition of disabled in
Toyota Motor Mfg., Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams.27 The plaintiff in this
case was unable to do her assembly line job without an
accommodation because she suffered from carpal tunnel syndrome.
The Toyota Court narrowly defined both the terms “substantially
limiting” and “major life activity,” determining that these terms
“need to be interpreted strictly to create a demanding standard for
qualifying as disabled.”28 The Court held that a “substantially
limiting” impairment must “prevent or severely restrict”29 an
individual from doing an activity that is of “central importance to
most people’s daily lives.”30 A major life activity therefore was not
21.

42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(3)-(4) (2012). See also Befort, supra note 1, at
2029.

22.

Sutton v. United Air Lines, 527 US 471, 472 (1999).

23.

Id. at 475.

24.

Id. at 475-76.

25.

Id.

26.

Id. at 490-491.

27.

Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002).

28.

Id. at 196-97.

29.

Id. at 198.

30.

Id.
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what was important in a particular plaintiff’s life but rather what was
important in “most people’s daily lives.”31 The Court determined that
the plaintiff in Toyota was not disabled because, while she was unable
to do the manual tasks necessary for an assembly line job, she was
able to do manual tasks that were of “central importance”32 in most
people’s daily lives. In the aftermath of Sutton and Toyota, the
majority of plaintiffs were unable to meet the statutory definition of
“disabled” under the ADA.
Under the Sutton and Toyota decisions, plaintiffs were often put
in a catch-22 situation where they were too disabled to qualify for or
keep the jobs that they wanted, but they were not disabled enough to
merit protection under the ADA. As a result, plaintiffs in employment
discrimination cases filed under the ADA had dismal win rates. One
study found that plaintiffs in Title I ADA employment discrimination
cases lost 97% of the time.33
Furthermore, as a result of the narrowing of the ADA’s protected
class under Sutton and Toyota, plaintiffs became significantly less
likely to file discrimination charges under the ADA.34 This is evident
in an examination of both the EEOC’s charge filing statistics and the
number of federal court cases that were filed in the aftermath of these
Supreme Court decisions.35 Employees with impairments assumed that
they would not be considered “disabled” under these restrictive
decisions, and that it would therefore be futile to file a discrimination
claim under the ADA.36
As this Part has explained, the Supreme Court’s restrictive
reading of the original ADA essentially negated Congressional intent
and left employees who had faced disability based discrimination with
little recourse. It is against this backdrop that Congress enacted the
ADAAA. Before addressing the impact of the ADAAA on mentally
ill employees in the workplace in Part IV, the next Part will address
the differences between mental illness and physical illness and some of
the unique hurdles faced by mentally ill employees.
III. What is Mental Illness?

31.

Id.

32.

Id.

33.

Amy L. Allbright, 2009 Employment Decisions Under the ADA Title
I—Survey Update, 34 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 339, 341
(2010). See Colker, supra note 3, at 108; Sharona Hoffman, Settling the
Matter: Does Title I of the ADA Work?, 59 ALAB. L. REV. 305, 308
(2008).

34.

Befort, supra note 1, at 2037-38.

35.

Id.

36.

Id.
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This Part will discuss the definition of mental illness, explain how
this definition has changed over time, and describe how mental illness
and physical illness differ. This Part will then address some of the
reasons why mentally ill employees are less likely than physically ill
employees to request accommodation in the workplace. Finally, this
Part will discuss the most prevalent stereotypes and stigmas involving
mental illness.
A.
Issues with the Definition and Diagnosis of Mental Illness
According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC), mental illness is defined as “collectively all diagnosable
mental disorders” or “health conditions that are characterized by
alterations in thinking, mood, or behavior (or some combination
thereof) associated with distress and/or impaired functioning.”37 As
one commentator explained, mental disorders always involve “some
disturbance of mental functioning, be it intellectual capacities,
thought processes, emotions, or underlying motivations.”38
The primary reference for mental health disorders, which is relied
on by mental health practitioners, courts and government agencies is
the American Psychiatric Association’s (APA) Diagnostic and
Statistic Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM).39 The DSM was first
published in 1952 and has been updated four times over the previous
six decades. The most recent version is DSM-5, which was released at
the APA Annual Meeting in May 2013.40 The DSM is often viewed as
the “bible” of mental illness and carries the stamp of objective
medical expertise. For example, some state statutes specifically
reference DSM’s definition of mental disorder.41 However, as one
commentator has explained, the DSM should not be viewed as a
psychiatric “bible” but is rather “simply a consensus-built medical
text with the attendant limits.”42
37.

Mental Health Basics, CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION,
http://www.cdc.gov/mentalhealth/basics.htm (last visited Jan. 27,
2015).

38.

Jane Byeff Korn, Crazy (Mental Illness Under the ADA), 36 U. MICH. J.
L. REFORM 585, 594 (2003).

39.

Douglas A. Hass, Could the American Psychiatric Association Cause
you Headaches? The Dangerous Interaction Between the DSM-5 and
Employment Law, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 683, 683 (2013).

40.

DSM-5 Overview, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N,
http://www.dsm5.org/about/Pages/DSMVOverview.aspx (last visited
Jan. 27, 2015).

41.

Connecticut’s statutes state that mental disorders are defined as what is
in “the most recent edition of the American Psychiatric Association’s
‘Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders.’” CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 38a-488a.

42.

Hass, supra note 39, at 689.
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Mental illness generally differs from physical illness in a number
of ways that are important when addressing disability accommodation
in the workplace under the ADAAA. The definition of mental illness
is somewhat illusive and continually in flux.43 Every version of the
DSM includes different disorders, and what constitutes a mental
disorder has evolved over time and is susceptible to cultural and
societal norms.44 For example, homosexuality was considered a
mental disorder until pressure within the APA led to its removal from
the DSM in 1980. In pointing out the fluidity of the definition of
mental illness, one commentator stated, “Wouldn[‘]t [sic] it be nice if
we could rally and lobby and get the medical profession to take a vote
and eliminate cancer as a deadly disease.”45 Currently, there is a
gendered pattern to mental illness and woman are significantly more
likely to be diagnosed with common mental disorders including
depression and anxiety.46 Additionally, psychiatrists and psychologists
may diagnose the same patient differently based on the particular
clinician’s views and background.
The general trend has been an increase in the number of
diagnosable mental disorders in each successive version of the DSM.47
DSM IV lists 297 mental disorders which is an increase of
approximately 300% over the number of disorders listed in DSM-I
which was published 42 years earlier.48 The current version of the
DSM, DSM-5, has been criticized for being both expansive and
continuing the move “towards a spectrum model of mental illness.”49
In other words, DSM-5 captures subthreshold (e.g., mild depression,
mild cognitive disorder) versions of existing disorders.50
The diagnosis of mental illness also tends to be significantly more
subjective than the diagnosis of physical illness.51 Many common
43.

See generally Deirdre M. Smith, The Paradox of Personality: Mental
Illness, Employment Discrimination, and The Americans With
Disabilities Act, GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 79, 98-100 (2006).

44.

See id. at 90. See also generally Hass, supra note 39. This has led one
historian of mental illness to conclude “It is not only cynics who claim
that polito-cultural, racial, and gender prejudices still shape the
diagnosis of what are purportedly objective disease syndromes.” ROY
PORTER, MADNESS: A BRIEF HISTORY 214 (2002).

45.

Korn, supra note 38, at 624.

46.

See id. at 596.

47.

See id. at 624.

48.

Hass, supra note 39, at 690.

49.

Id. at 712-13.

50.

Id. at 713.

51.

Michelle Parikh, Burning the Candle at Both Ends, and there is Nothing
Left for Proof: The Americans with Disabilities Act’s Disservice to
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physical illnesses are diagnosed in an objective manner through the
use of bloods tests, MRIs, x-rays, and electrocardiograms. There are a
smaller number of physical illnesses that are diagnosed based on selfreporting of symptoms, such as chronic migraines52 and fibromagylia.53
Mental illness, on the other hand, is diagnosed primarily based on the
self-reporting of symptoms and to a lesser extent on observations of a
patient. There are also studies that indicate that in some cases
Additionally, mental
mental illness can be objectively proven. 54
health professionals can often determine when an individual is faking
symptoms of mental illness.55 However, in general, objective proof is
more readily available in cases of physical illness than in cases of
mental illness. Additionally, mental illness is often invisible. For
example, a mentally ill individual will not have a seeing eye dog, use a
wheel chair, or be missing a limb — and people tend to be skeptical of
things that they cannot see.56 These distinction have led skeptics to
doubt that mental illness is real.57
Another factor that often distinguishes mental and physical illness
is that mental illness tends to be episodic.58 Various types of mental
disorders, such as bipolar disorder and forms of depression may be
chronic with acute episodes followed by a return to a normal level of

Persons with Mental Illness, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 721, 748-51 (2004).
See generally Korn, supra note 38, at 622-27 (discussing the biological
basis of mental illness).
52.

See, e.g., P.J. Goadsby, Migraine: Diagnosis and Management, 33
INTERNAL MED. J. 436 (2003).

53.

See, e.g., Robert S. Katz et al., Fibromyalgia Diagnosis: A Comparison
of Clinical, Survey and American College of Rheumatology Criteria, 54
ARTHRITIS & RHEUMATISM 169 (2006).

54.

See, e.g., Elizabeth R. Sowell et al., Brain Abnormalities Observed in
Childhood-Onset Schizophrenia: A Review of the Structural Magnetic
Resonance Imaging Literature, 6 MENTAL RETARDATION &
DEVELOPMENT DISABILITIES RES. REV. 180 (2000).

55.

Douglas Starr, Can You Fake Mental Illness? How Forensic
Psychologists Can Tell Whether Someone is Malingering, SLATE
(Aug.
7,2012),
http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/
science/2012/08/faking_insanity_forensic_psychologists_detect_signs_
of_malingering_.html.

56.

Korn, supra note 38, at 605-06.

57.

See infra Part III.C.

58.

Susan Stefan, Delusions of Rights: Americans with Psychiatric
Disabilities, Employment Discrimination and the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 52 ALA. L. REV. 271, 281–82 (2000). There are also
some physical disabilities that are episodic such as lupus, multiple
sclerosis and epilepsy. Id. at 282.
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functioning.59 Since mental illness is episodic, recovery in mental
illness often does not mean that the individual is cured. The chronic
and episodic nature of mental illness makes it difficult to even define
what constitutes recovery from a serious mental illness.60
B. Issues Affecting Requests for Accommodation
Mentally ill employees are often less likely than physically ill
employees to ask for accommodation in the workplace. This may
leave a mentally ill employee unprotected, since employers are only
liable for discrimination under the ADA once they are made aware of
the employee’s disability and need for accommodation.61 One reason
that mentally ill employees do not ask for workplace accommodation
is that they may simply not realize that they are ill. If an employee is
in a manic, delusional or psychotic state, he may not recognize that
he is suffering from an illness and needs to request protection under
the ADA.62
The second reason that mentally ill employees do not ask for
accommodation under the ADA is because they are actively hiding
their disorder as a result of the stigma associated with mental illness.
Employees who are aware that they are suffering from a mental
disorder are often wary of letting their employer know they are ill
because that disclosure could negatively impact their careers and
potentially get them fired. Employees with psychiatric disabilities
often correctly assume that they will get greater protection by hiding
their disability than from the ADA.
C. Stereotypes and Stigmas Involving Mental Illness
Individuals who suffer from both physical and mental disabilities
have historically been stigmatized and subjected to discrimination.63
59.

See Breanne M. Sheetz, The Choice to Limit Choice: Using Psychiatric
Advance Directives to Manage the Effects of Mental Illness and Support
Self-Responsibility, 40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 401, 404 (2007).

60.

Larry Davidson et al., Recovery in Serious Mental Illness: A New Wine
or Just a New Bottle? 36 PROF. PSYCHOL. RES. & PRAC. 480 (2005)
(discussing the lack of consensus as to what constitutes recovery in
mental illness and the various definitions of recovery); Larry Davidson
and David Roe, Recovery from Versus Recovery in Serious Mental
Illness: One Strategy for Lessening Confusion Plaguing Recovery, 16 J.
MENTAL HEALTH 459, 460 (2007) (discussing the various meanings of
recovery in mental illness).

61.

Stefan, supra note 58, at 289-90.

62.

Id. at 401-03.

63.

Patrick W. Corrigan & David L. Penn, Lessons from Social Psychology
on Discrediting Psychiatric Stigma, 54 AM. PSYCHOL. 765 (1999). See
also Wendy F. Hensel & Gregory Todd Jones, Bridging the PhysicalMental Gap: An Empirical Look at the Impact of Mental Illness Stigma
on ADA Outcomes, 73 TENN. L. REV. 47, 50-51 (2005); Stefan, supra
note 58, at 273-74; Korn, supra note 38, at 605-09.
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However, the stigma associated with mental illness is both greater and
more pervasive than the stigma associated with physical illness.64 The
public is less likely to rent a house to a mentally ill individual and less
likely to socialize with someone suffering from mental illness.65
Employers are often reluctant to hire individuals with mental illness,
which leads to both unemployment and underemployment. 66 Studies
have also shown that it is specifically the stigma of mental illness—
and not only the functional limitations associated with mental
illness—that have led to lower mean wages for those who suffer from
mental illness in comparison to those who do not.67 This subpart will
look at some of the negative stereotypes associated with mental
illness.
1. Not a Real Disease; Just a Character Defect
One of the most prevalent stereotypes is that mental illness is not
a real disease.68 This stereotype stems from the fact that mental
illness is often invisible and cannot be objectively proven.69 Cynics
and skeptics may therefore doubt it is real. It is interesting to note
that individuals who suffer from a physical disability along with a
mental disability do better in the workforce than individuals suffering
only from mental illness.70 In other words, having a “real” physical
illness makes the accompanying mental illness more believable. For
example, if someone has cancer, it would make sense that the
individual might also suffer from depression and anxiety.71
This skepticism and doubt that mental illness is “real” tends to
64.

Hensel & Jones, supra note 63, at 51. See also Bethany A. Teachman
et al., Implicit and Explicit Stigma of Mental Illness in Diagnosed and
Healthy Samples, 25 J. SOC. & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 75, 76 (2006)
(discussing differing attitudes towards mental illness and physical
illness).

65.

Patrick W. Corrigan et al., Challenging Two Mental Illness Stigmas:
Personal Responsibility and Dangerousness, 28 SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL.
293, 293-95 (2002).

66.

See Cressida Manning & Peter D. White, Attitudes of Employers to the
Mentally Ill, 19 PSYCHIATRIC BULL. 541 (1995).

67.

See Marjorie L. Baldwin & Steven C. Marcus, Perceived and Measured
Stigma Among Workers with Serious Mental Illness, 57 PSYCHIATRIC
SERVICES 388, 391 (2006).

68.

Terry Krupa et al., Understanding the Stigma of Mental Illness in
Employment, 33 WORK 413, 419 (2009).

69.

See supra Part III.A.

70.

Edward H. Yelin & Miriam G. Cisternas, Employment Patterns among
People with and without Mental Conditions, in MENTAL DISORDER,
WORK DISABILITY, AND THE LAW 25, 35 (Richard J. Bonnie & John
Monahan eds., 1997).

71.

Korn, supra note 38, at 607-08.
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lead to one of two conclusions. First, some believe that mental illness
is nothing more than a character defect or a personality flaw. Second,
others believe that individuals claiming to be “mentally ill” are just
malingerers looking to take advantage of their employer.
Historically, mental illness has been associated with undesirable
personality characteristics and personal shortcomings. Mentally ill
individuals are often viewed as weak, unstable and unable to deal
with the stress of everyday life.72 According to this line of reasoning,
individuals who claim to be mentally ill simply need to “buck up” and
behave in a more appropriate and desirable manner. Proponents of
this view believe that everyone has to deal with difficult situations
and occasionally feels anxious or sad, and individuals who claim to be
mentally ill simply need to try harder.
This stereotype of mental illness as a character flaw was evident
in comments made by senators during the Congressional debates
regarding passage of the ADA. For example, Sen. William L.
Armstrong (R-CO) stated that he thought that the purpose of the
legislation was to protect the handicapped and people in wheelchairs
and he could not imagine giving “protected status” to disabilities that
“might have a moral content to them.”73 Sen. Jesse Helms (R-GA)
was concerned about the impact on an employer’s ability to maintain
moral standards if coverage extended to employees who were manic
depressives and schizophrenics.74 Even one of the co-sponsors of the
ADA, Sen. Warren Rudman (R-NH), expressed concern with
including mental illness since it “is frequently made on the basis of a
pattern of socially unacceptable behavior and lacks any physiological
basis…[W]e are talking about behavior that is immoral, improper or
illegal and which individuals are engaging in of their own volition.”75
It is noteworthy that mental illness was the only type of disability
that was specifically attacked during the Congressional debates on the
ADA.76
The idea that mental illness is not a real disease has also lead to
the conclusion that mentally ill individuals are malingerers who are
actively faking symptoms to deceive others and get some type of

72.

See id. at 605-06.

73.

135 CONG. REC. S10753 (daily ed. Sep. 7, 1989) (statement of Sen.
Armstrong).

74.

135 CONG. REC. S10765 (daily ed. Sep. 7, 1989) (statement of Sen.
Helms).

75.

Id. at S10796 (statement of Sen. Rudman).

76.

SUSAN STEFAN, UNEQUAL RIGHTS:
WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES AND THE

DISCRIMINATION AGAINST PEOPLE
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT
6 (Allison Risko & Amy J. Clarke eds. 2001).
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preferential treatment. 77 This stereotype is evident in the popular
press, scholarly literature, and court opinions.78 It encompasses
individuals who may either be fully faking their “illness” as well as
those who are exaggerating their illness for personal benefit. This
concern that individuals could fake mental disorders has been raised
in a different context at the United States Supreme Court.79
Perhaps nobody embodies this stereotype better than Vincent
Gigante—one of the most powerful Mafia leaders in the United States
who did fake his mental illness for decades in an effort to hide his
Mafia position and avoid prison time.80 He was often seen wandering
around Greenwich Village in New York City in his bathrobe and
slippers mumbling to himself. After his conviction, a prison
psychologist grudgingly complimented the “sophistication of his
malingering attempt.”81 Unfortunately for individuals who really do
suffer from mental illness, the stereotype of the mentally ill as
malingerers remains prevalent in society.82
2. The Stereotype of the Mentally Ill as Violent
Another stereotype involving mental illness is that mentally ill
individuals are more dangerous and violent than the general
population, and that mental illness is actually a specific type of
character flaw.83 This view of the mentally ill as violent has been
perpetuated by the media and is seen in both movies and television
programs where mentally ill individuals are often portrayed as
psychotic killers and evil people.84 Additionally, when horrific crimes
are committed, the media often focuses on the role played by mental
77.

Hensel & Jones, supra note 63, at 55-56.

78.

Id.

79.

In a death penalty case involving an intellectually disabled/mentally
retarded defendant, Justice Scalia expressed concern that “the
symptoms of this condition can readily be feigned.” Atkins v. Virginia,
536 U.S. 304, 353 (2006) (Scalia, J., dissenting).

80.

Selwyn Raab, Vincent Gigante, Mob Boss Who Feigned Incompetence
to Avoid Jail, Dies at 77, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 20, 2005),
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/20/obituaries/vincent-gigante-mobboss-who-feigned-incompetence-to-avoid-jail-dies-at-77.html.

81.

Larry McShane, Vincent Gigante (Vinny the Chin) Never Abandoned
Demented Alter Ego In Prison, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Dec. 3, 2007),
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/crime/vincent-gigante-vinny-chinabandoned-demented-alter-ego-prison-article-1.271384.

82.

See Starr, supra note 55 (Gigante only admitted his ruse in exchange for
a plea deal).

83.

See Ann Hubbard, The ADA, The Workplace and the Myth of the
Dangerous Mentally Ill, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 849, 850–51 (2001).

84.

Korn, supra note 38, at 608.

218

Health Matrix·Volume 26·Issue 1·2016
Mentally Ill Employees in the Workplace:
Does the ADA Amendments Act Provide Adequate Protection?

illness in the commission of the crime, further perpetuating the
stereotype that mental illness makes people violent. One recent
example is focus on the perpetrator’s mental illness in coverage of the
2012 school shooting at the Sandy Hook Elementary School in
Newton, Connecticut, where 20 children and 6 adult staff members
were killed by a gunman.85 The view that mentally ill individuals are
violent and dangerous has become embedded in American culture.86
While the research is somewhat mixed as to whether mentally ill
individuals are more violent than the general population, any
correlation that exists is both small and overly exaggerated in the
public’s mind. Some studies have found that mentally ill individuals
are not more likely to be violent.87 Other studies have found that
while there is a small correlation between violence and mental illness,
this correlation is primarily caused by other comorbid factors.88 The
author of one meta-analysis explained that “mental disorders are
neither necessary nor sufficient causes of violence.”89 The major
determinants of propensity toward violence are being young, male and
from a lower socio-economic status.90 Other determinants of violence
include marital status and education.91 Substance abuse is also a
significant determinant of violence, and a meta-analysis found that
most of the excess risk of violence in individuals with psychosis is
Mentally ill
caused by substance abuse and not the psychosis.92
individuals are far more likely to be the victim of violence than they
are to engage in violent behavior.93
The stereotype of mentally ill individuals as dangerous is
85.

Sydney Lupkin, Newton Shooting Put Spotlight on U.S. Mental Health
Care – Again, ABCNEWS.COM, http://abcnews.go.com/Health/
newtown-shootings-put-spotlight-mental-health-care/story?id=18001556
(last visited Jan. 27, 2015).

86.

Korn, supra note 38, at 608.

87.

Paul S. Appelbaum et al., Violence and Delusions: Data from the
MacArthur Violence Risk Assessment Study, 157 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY
566, 566–72 (2000) (finding that delusions were not associated with a
higher risk of violent behavior).

88.

Heather Stuart, Violence and Mental Illness: An Overview, 2 WORLD
PSYCHIATRY 121, 123 (2003); Fazel Seena et. al., Schizophrenics and
Violence: Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis, 6 PLoS 1, 5 (2009).

89.

Stuart, supra note 88, at 123.

90.

Id.

91.

Korn, supra note 38, at 613.

92.

Seena et al., supra note 88, at 7 (explaining that substance abusers
without psychosis are just as likely to be violent as substance abusers
who do suffer from psychosis).

93.

Stuart, supra note 88, at 123.
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responsible for a significant portion of employment discrimination
against the mentally ill.94 Employers, concerned with both violence in
the workplace generally as well as their potential liability for hiring
violent individuals, are often reluctant to hire mentally ill
individuals.95 Unfortunately, it is often very difficult to predict
violent behavior, regardless of whether or not an individual suffers
from mental illness.96 While the public may assume that workplace
violence is preventable and predictable, most experts disagree, and
even trained psychiatrists have difficulty accurately predicting
workplace violence. 97 While it is not possible to entirely eliminate the
risk of workplace violence, employers can still take reasonable steps to
minimize the risk, such as reviewing their hiring process, conducting
thorough background checks, and keeping their security measures and
disciplinary policies up to date.98 Unfortunately, though, the inability
to accurately predict violent behavior along with the stereotype that
mentally ill individuals are violent continues to lead to discrimination
against the mentally ill.
3. The Stereotype of the Mentally Ill as Incompetent
Another stereotype is that mentally ill individuals are
incompetent and have difficulty functioning as capable adults.99
While some individuals with psychiatric disorders may in fact be
found to be legally incompetent or “mentally incapacitated,” many
mentally ill individuals are not. Since mental illness is often episodic,
individuals may go through periods when they are incompetent
followed by long periods of high functioning. However, the stereotype
persists and results in the paternalistic view that mentally ill
individuals generally need others to care for them. This concern was
raised during the Congressional debates on the ADA.100 This
stereotype is particularly harmful to mentally ill individuals in the
94.

John Monahan et. al., Developing a Clinically Useful Actuarial Tool for
Assessing Violence Risk, 176 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 312 (2000)
(discussing the effect of stereotypes on the mentally ill).

95.

Korn, supra note 38, at 613-14.

96.

Id. at 614.

97.

See Richard A. Friedman, Why Can’t Doctors Identify Killers?, N.Y.
TIMES (May 27, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/28/opinion/
why-cant-doctors-identify-killers.html?_r=0; David Brown, Predicting
Violence is a Work in Progress, WASH. POST (Jan. 3, 2013),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/predictingviolence-is-a-work-in-progress/2013/01/03/2e8955b8-5371-11e2-a613ec8d394535c6_story.html.

98.

Korn, supra note 38, at 614-15.

99.

Krupa et al., supra note 68, at 418-19; Hensel & Jones, supra note 63.

100. Concannon, supra note 19, at 82.
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workplace, since few employers would want to hire an incompetent
employee. Employees who suffer from mental illness are also less
likely to have opportunities for training and promotion since their
employers tend to focus on their deficits rather than their strengths.101
As this Part explained, there are some important ways in which
mental illness and physical illness differ, and there are numerous
stereotypes and stigmas associated with mental illness. Additionally,
mentally ill employees may be less likely than physically ill employees
to request workplace accommodation. The next Part will focus on
how the ADAAA impacts mentally ill employees in the workplace.
IV. The Impact of the ADAAA’s Expanded Definition
of “Disability” on Mentally Ill Employees
This Part discusses the impact that the ADAAA has had on
mentally ill employees in the workplace. It specifically addresses how
the ADAAA overturned the Supreme Court’s restrictive decisions and
broadened the definition of disability. In doing so, this Part explores
the impact that the expanded definition of disability has had on
mentally ill employees and the ways in which it has increased
protection for these employees. The focus of this Part will be on
federal court decisions.
A.
Generally Broadening the Term “Disability”
The purpose of the ADAAA was to broaden the term disability
and overrule the Supreme Court’s decisions in Sutton and Toyota, and
not surprisingly, under the ADAAA courts have interpreted
“disability” in a significantly more expansive manner than they did in
the pre-ADAAA cases.102
Despite its expressly stated purpose of expanding the
interpretation of “disability,” the ADAAA did not actually change the
language defining “disabled” from what was included in the original
language of the ADA.103 As a result of political compromise aimed at
increasing the likelihood of passage of the ADAAA, the definition of
disabled remained identical to the definition that the Toyota Court
had narrowly interpreted.104 Instead, the ADAAA made smaller

101. Krupa et al., supra note 68, at 419.
102. Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No.
110-325 § 2(b)(2)-(5), (122 Stat.) 3553, 3554 (2008). See also generally
Kevin M. Barry, Exactly What Congress Intended? 17 EMP. RTS. &
EMP. POL’Y J. 5, 19-20 (2013) (discussing the broadened definition of
disability under the ADAAA).
103. Kate Webber, Correcting the Supreme Court—Will it Listen? Using the
Models of Judicial Decision-Making to Predict the Future of the ADA
Amendments Act, 23 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 305, 320-21 (2014).
104. Id. For a general discussion of the history of passage of the ADAAA, see
Barry, supra note 102; Kevin Barry, Toward Universalism: What the

221

Health Matrix·Volume 26·Issue 1·2016
Mentally Ill Employees in the Workplace:
Does the ADA Amendments Act Provide Adequate Protection?

changes to the ADA including instructional amendments which
provide direction on how courts should interpret the ADAAA.105 The
Statement of Purpose of the ADAAA states that “the primary object
of attention in cases brought under the ADAAA should be whether
entities covered under the ADA have complied with their obligations
and…the question of whether an individual’s impairment is a disability
under the ADAAA should not demand extensive analysis.”106 The new
Rules of Construction of the ADAAA also require a more expansive
interpretation of the term disability stating that “the definition of
disability in this Act shall be construed in favor of broad coverage of
individuals under the Act.”107 In addition to generally broadening the
term disability, the ADAAA also specifically expands the term
disability in a manner that is applicable to mental illness which will
be discussed in the following four Subparts.108
Cases interpreting the term disability under the ADAAA have
begun to work their way through the courts. While the ADAAA was
passed in 2008 and became effective on January 1, 2009, it does not
apply retroactively to cases that were pending prior to its effective
date.109 In post-ADAAA decisions, courts are granting significantly
fewer summary judgment rulings to employers based on disability
status alone.110 This is an important change, since in the aftermath
of the Sutton decision and prior to the enactment of the ADAAA,
plaintiffs in employment discrimination cases filed under the ADA
had dismal win rates, with many courts granting summary judgment
for the employer based on a determination that the plaintiff did not
meet the statutory definition of disabled.111 Furthermore, as a result
of the narrowing of the ADA’s protected class under Sutton and
Toyota, plaintiffs were unlikely to even file discrimination charges
since they assumed that they would lose based on disability status

ADA Amendments Act of 2008 Can and Can’t do for Disability Rights,
31 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 203, 278 (2010).
105. Webber, supra note 103, at 321-22.
106. ADAAA § 2(b)(5), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2008).
107. 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2012).
108. Befort, supra note 1, at 2043-44.
109. Id. at 2031.
110. Id. at 2031-32. See also ROBERT L. BURGDORF JR., NATIONAL COUNCIL
ON DISABILITY, A PROMISING START: PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF COURT
DECISIONS UNDER THE ADA AMENDMENTS ACT 8 (2013). But see
Webber, supra note 103, at 347-49.
111. Befort, supra note 1, at 2038; Colker, supra note 3, at 107-16; Schmall,
supra note 7, at 652-53; Hoffman, supra note 33, at 308-11.
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alone.112
While the generally expanded definition of disabled is a positive
development for both physically and mentally disabled employees, it
appears to be more helpful to physically disabled employees. As
explained in Part II, a plaintiff must both be “disabled” and also be
“qualified” to establish class membership under Title I of the ADA.
One 2005 study of three circuit courts found that physically and
mentally impaired plaintiffs had similar levels of difficulty establishing
class membership under the ADA.113 However, there were important
differences in why plaintiffs failed to establish class membership.
Approximately two-thirds of plaintiffs suffering from a physical illness
were found to lack protected class status under the ADA because they
were not “disabled” within the meaning of the statute. On the other
hand, two-thirds of mentally ill employees were found to lack
protected class status because they were “unqualified” under the
terms of the ADA.114
Therefore, while both physically and mentally ill employees were
often unable to establish class membership post-Sutton and preADAAA, the biggest hurdle faced by physically ill employees was the
definition of disabled and the biggest hurdle faced by mentally ill
employees was the definition of qualified. While the ADAAA expands
the definition of “disability,” no significant changes were made to the
definition of “qualified.”115 As a result, while the expanded definition
of disability has already and likely will continue to increase class
membership for both physically and mentally disabled employees, the
increase will be more pronounced for employees with physical
disabilities.116
Another recent study looked at federal court decisions between
January 2010 and April 2013 and compared cases that were decided
under the pre-amendment standards with those decided under the
post-amendment standard.117 Like the 2005 study, this study—which
112. Befort, supra note 1, at 2037-38.
113. Hensel & Jones, supra note 63, at 65-69 (indicating that while plaintiffs
with mental disabilities were slightly less likely to establish class
membership than plaintiffs with physical disabilities, the difference was
not statistically significant).
114. Id.
115. American with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12111 (1990)
(amended 2008).
116. Concannon, supra note 19, at 113.
117. See generally Befort, supra note 1. Since the ADAAA does not apply
retroactively to cases that were pending prior to the date it went into
effect courts were deciding cases under both the pre-ADAAA and postADAAA standards during this time period. Id. at 2031.
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analyzed a different set of cases—also found that the narrow preADAAA definition of disability was a bigger hurdle for physically
disabled individuals than for mentally disabled individuals.
Summary judgment was granted to the employer in 78.3% of preamendment cases involving a physical disability but only 60% of the
pre-amendment cases involving a mental disability based on
While post-amendment, the likelihood of
“disability status.”118
surviving summary judgment increased for both physically and
mentally ill employees in cases involving “disability status,” the
increase was much greater for employees who suffered from a physical
disability.119 Post amendment summary judgment was granted to the
employer in 20.7% of cases involving physical illness and 40% of cases
involving mental illness.120 In other words, the summary judgment
win rate for employers based on disability status dropped from 78.3%
to 20.7% in cases involving a physical disability and dropped from
60% to 40% in cases involving a mental disability.121
It appears that the expanded definition of disability has helped
both physically and mentally disabled employees, but the impact has
been greater on employees with a physical disability. The following
four Subparts will discuss some of the specific ways in which the
expanded definition of disability applies to mentally ill employees in
the workplace.
B. Mitigating Measures
As explained in the previous subpart, the ADAAA does not
change the statutory language defining disabled, but rather explains
that the purpose of the Act is to expand how the definition of
disability is interpreted. In doing so, the Act explicitly rejects the
Sutton Court’s holding that an employee’s disability should be
considered in its mitigated state. Rather, under the ADAAA “the
determination of whether an impairment substantially limits a major
life activity shall be made without regard to the ameliorative effects of
mitigating measures.”122 The ADAAA does recognize as an exception
that the “ameliorative effects of the mitigating measures of ordinary
eyeglasses or contact lenses shall be considered in determining
whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity.”123
The 2011 EEOC Regulations paraphrase the ADAAA’s language on

118. Id. at 2053.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 2054.
122. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(E)(i).
123. Id. at § 12102(4)(E)(ii).

224

Health Matrix·Volume 26·Issue 1·2016
Mentally Ill Employees in the Workplace:
Does the ADA Amendments Act Provide Adequate Protection?

mitigating measures.124
The amendment to the ADAAA regarding mitigating measures
has been consistently applied by the courts and has expanded the
definition of disability for both physically and mentally disabled
employees.125 One report explained that this is not surprising since
the change to the statutory language regarding mitigating factors is
“unequivocal and not particularly complicated, and in fact,
represented a return to a widely accepted analytical premise abruptly
discarded by the Supreme Court.”126 Another scholar explained that a
“court would be hard-pressed…to consider mitigating measures in
contravention of such direct language.”127
Since medication and therapy are commonly used to control
mental illness and both medication and therapy are also explicitly
listed by the ADAAA as a mitigating measure,128 this provision of the
ADAAA will increase the number of mentally ill employees who have
standing under the Act.
In pre-ADAAA cases, mentally ill
employees who were able to control diseases such as bipolar
disorder,129 schizophrenia130 and depression through the use of
mitigating measures would not have met the statutory definition of
disability. Post-ADAAA, these individuals will have their mental
impairment considered in its unmitigated state.
The amendment regarding mitigating measures will likely have a
noticeable impact with regard to clinically depressed employees
because depression is both a common disorder, and a disorder that
124. 20 C.F.R § 1630.2(j)(1)(vi) (2012).
125. See, e.g., Orne v. Christie, No. 3:12-CV-00290-JAG, 2013 WL 85171, at
*3 (E.D. Va. Jan. 7, 2013) (finding plaintiff with sleep apnea was
disabled despite mitigating measures); Harty v. City of Sanford, 2012
WL3243282 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 8, 2012) (denying summary judgment for
employer after determining that an employee’s disability should be
examined in unmitigated state); O’Donnell v. Colonial Intermediate
Unit 20, 2013 WL 1234813 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 27, 2013) (determining that
impairments should be examined in unmitigated state in case involving
several mental health conditions, but ultimately dismissing the
plaintiff’s claim on other grounds).
126. Burgdorf, supra note 110, at 65.
127. Webber, supra note 103, at 344.
128. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(E)(i)(I)-(IV). See also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(5)(v)
(2012) (listing “psychotherapy” and “behavioral therapy” as mitigating
measures).
129. Barry, supra note 102, at 227-28; Alex B. Long, Introducing the New
and Improved Americans with Disabilities Act: Assessing the ADA
Amendments Act of 2008, 103 NW U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 217, 220
(2008).
130. Concannon, supra note 19, at 111.
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can be helped with mitigating measures. Clinical depression is one of
the most prevalent diseases in the United States and antidepressants
are one of the most commonly prescribed medications for working age
Americans.131 According to the Center for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC), approximately 1 in 10 Americans suffer from
depression and the age group most likely to suffer are 45-64 year
olds.132 Antidepressants are the most commonly used medication for
all individuals in the United States aged 18-44.133 Certain groups
have particularly high rates of use of antidepressants. 15.9% of people
aged 40-59 in the United States take antidepressants and 23% of
women aged 40-59 take anti-depressants.134 While the majority of
individuals take antidepressants to treat depression, they are also
used to treat other diseases such as anxiety disorders.135
Like other mental disorders, prior to ADAAA, if an employee’s
depression was successfully treated with antidepressants, she would
not meet the statutory definition of disability under the ADA.136 This
meant that she was not entitled to any protection under the Act, and
could be terminated because of her mental illness. In post-ADAAA
cases involving depression, courts must examine the employee’s
disability in its unmitigated state and plaintiffs are more likely to
meet the statutory definition of disabled.137 However, the employee is
131. Elisa Y. Lee, An American Way of Life: Prescription Drug Use in the
Modern ADA Workplace, 45 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 303, 309
(2011).
132. An Estimated 1 in 10 U.S. Adults Report Depression, CENTER FOR
DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/features/
dsdepression (last visited Jan. 27, 2015).
133. Laura A. Pratt et al., Antidepressant Use in Persons Aged 12 and Over:
United States, 2005-2008, NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STAT. (October
2011), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/databriefs/db76.htm.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. See Befort, supra note 1, at 2039; Parikh, supra note 51, at 740
(explaining that mitigating measures would include psychotropic
medications). See also, e.g., Allen v. Bellwouth Telecommunications
Inc., F. App’x 197, 200 (6th Cir. 2012); Spades v. City of Walnut Ridge,
186 F.3d 897, 900 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding plaintiff was not disabled
within meaning of the ADA because his depression was treated with
medication and counseling); McMullin v. Ashcroft, 337 F. Supp. 2d
1281, 1288-9 (D. Wyo. 2004) (determining plaintiff whose clinical
depression was treated with medication was not disabled under the
ADA).
137. See, e.g., Bracken v. DASKO Home Med. Equip., Inc., No. 1:12–CV–
892, 2014 WL 4388261, at *11 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 5, 2014) (holding that
the ameliorative effect of medication on employee with depression
should not be considered).
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still required to demonstrate that the impairment in its unmitigated
state meets the statutory definition of disability.138
C. Episodic Disorders
The ADAAA specifically extends the protection of the ADA to
individuals with disabilities that are episodic in nature, stating that
an “impairment that is episodic or in remission is a disability if it
would substantially limit a major life activity when active.”139 The
2011 EEOC regulations both paraphrase the ADAAA and provide
additional guidance regarding this expanded definition.140 While prior
to passage of the ADAAA some courts had determined that
impairments that were episodic would meet the statutory definition of
disability,141 many held that episodic illnesses were not disabilities.142
The Supreme Court’s decision in Sutton seemed to support the more
restrictive reading with the Court stating that an individual must be
“presently – not potentially or hypothetically – substantially limited
in order to demonstrate a disability.”143 This provision of the ADAAA
has expanded the definition of disability in cases involving both
physical and mental ill employees.144
Extending the protection of the ADA to individuals whose
impairments are episodic in nature is likely to be particularly
beneficially to mentally disabled individuals, since mental illness is
often episodic.145 Prior to passage of the ADAAA, the episodic nature
of mental illness meant that mentally ill individuals in remission

138. See, e.g., O’Donnell v. Colonial Intermediate Unit 20, 2013 WL 1234813
(E.D. Pa.) (holding that plaintiff did not demonstrate that mental
impairment in its unmitigated state substantially limited a major life
activity).
139. 42 U.S.C. §12102(4)(D).
140. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(vii) (2012).
141. See, e.g., Vande Zande v. Wis. Dep’t of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 544 (7th
Cir. 1999) (holding that an “intermittent impairment” disability is
entitled to protection of ADA and must be reasonably accommodated).
See also Concannon, supra note 19, at 103-04.
142. See, e.g., Garrett v. Univ. of Ala. at Birmingham Bd. of Tr., 507 F.3d
1306, 1315 (11th Cir. 2007) (noting that plaintiff with cancer did not
meet statutory definition of disabled because of episodic nature of
disease). See also Todd v. Academy Corp., 57 F. Supp. 2d 448, 453-54
(S.D. Tex. 1999) (finding plaintiff with epilepsy not disabled because of
episodic nature of disease).
143. Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 482-83 (1999) (noting that
the Court was not specifically considering the issue of episodic
impairments). See also Concannon, supra note 19, at 104.
144. Befort, supra, note 1 at 259-60.
145. See Stefan, supra note 58, at 281–82.

227

Health Matrix·Volume 26·Issue 1·2016
Mentally Ill Employees in the Workplace:
Does the ADA Amendments Act Provide Adequate Protection?

might not be protected by the ADA.146 However, in post-ADAAA
cases, courts have extended the statute’s protection to cover mentally
ill individuals whose diseases are episodic.147 In listing examples of
impairments that are episodic in nature, it is noteworthy that the
EEOC Guidelines specifically list a number of mental disorders
including major depressive disorder, bipolar disorder, schizophrenia
and post-traumatic stress disorder.148
D. Defining “Substantially Limits” and “Major Life Activity”
The ADAAA leaves in place the terms “substantially limits” and
“major life activity” but clarifies that these terms should be
interpreted more broadly.149 The purpose section of the ADAAA
specifically rejects that Supreme Court’s decision in Toyota that the
terms “‘substantially’ and ‘major’ in the definition of disability should
be interpreted strictly to create a demanding standard for qualifying
The purpose section further rejects Toyota’s
as ‘disabled.’”150
standard that to be “substantially limited in performing a major life
activity under the ADA ‘an individual must have an impairment that
prevents or severely restricts the individual from doing activities that
are of central importance to most people’s daily lives.’”151 While the
statute rejects Toyota’s interpretation of “substantially limits,” it is
noteworthy that it fails to provide a new definition for that term.152
The ADAAA does more specifically define “major life activity” by
including an illustrative list of “major life activities”153 and specifying
146. See, e.g., Soileau v. Gulford of Me., Inc., 105 F.3d 12, 16 (1st Cir. 1997)
(noting that an employee with dysthymia, a chronic depressive disorder
characterized by intermittent bouts of depression, was not disabled
under the terms of the ADA because of the episodic nature of the
disease).
147. See, e.g., Estate of Murray v. UHS of Fairmount, Inc., No. 10-2561,
2011 WL 5449364, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 10, 2011) (finding that an
employee whose depression was episodic was disabled under the
ADAAA, since her disease, when active, substantially limited her ability
to think, eat, and sleep); see also Kinney v. Century Servs. Corp. II, No.
10-787, 2011 WL 3476569, at *8 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 9, 2011) (finding that
an employee was disabled under the ADAAA despite episodic nature of
her depression).
148. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(vii) (2012).
149. Jeannette Cox, Crossroads and Signposts: The ADA Amendments Act
of 2008, 85 IND. L.J. 187, 201-02 (2010).
150. ADAAA § 2(b)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2008); Concannon, supra note 19,
at 102-03.
151. ADAAA § 2(b)(4), 42 U.S.C. 12101 (2008).
152. Webber, supra note 103, at 322.
153. 42 § U.S.C. 12102(2)(A) (stating that major life activities “include, but
are not limited to caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing,
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that major life activities include the operation of major bodily
function.154 The 2011 EEOC Guidelines both paraphrase and give
further examples of what constitutes a substantial limitation and a
major life activity.155
While the majority of courts in pre-ADAAA cases strictly
construed the term “major life activity,”156 there was also a lack of
consensus regarding the definition of this term. 157 Courts struggled
with the question of when limitations typically associated with mental
illness constituted a substantial limitation on a major life activity,158
and were often unsympathetic to mentally ill employees in these
cases.159 For example, pre-ADAAA cases questioned whether
interacting and getting along with others,160 or concentrating were
hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking,
breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating
and working”); see also Jeffrey Douglas Jones, Enfeebling the ADA: The
ADA Amendments Act of 2008, 62 OKLA. L. REV. 667, 675 (2010).
154. 42 § U.S.C. 12102(2)(B) (“[A] major life activity also includes the
operation of a major bodily function, including but not limited to,
functions of the immune system, normal cell growth, digestive, bowel,
bladder, neurological, brain, respiratory, circulatory, endocrine, and
reproductive functions.”).
155. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h-j) (2011).
156. Stefan, supra note 58, at 311 (discussing how “severe, chronic illnesses,
including cancer, are not disabilities under the ADA because they do
not constitute substantial limitations on major life activities”).
157. Sharona Hoffman, The Importance of Immutability in Employment
Discrimination Law, 52 WILLIAM & MARY L. REV. 1483, 1491 (2011)
(discussing the lack of clarity in pre-ADAAA jurisprudence regarding
when a disability substantially limits a major life activity); Korn, supra
note 38, at 640 (discussing the difficulty courts have in determining
what constitutes a major life activity); Concannon, supra note 19, at 94
(discussing the meaning of “substantially limits” and “major life
activity”).
158. Korn, supra note 38, at 640-41.
159. See id. at 598-99, 640-41; Parikh, supra note 51, at 749-50 and n. 181.
Additionally, the pre-ADAAA EEOC Interpretive Guidelines focused on
activities that are typically associated with physical illness and not on
activities that are typically associated with mental illness. See, e.g.,
Korn, supra note 38, at 598; and Stefan, supra note 58, at 282-83.
160. See Deidre M. Smith, The Paradox of Personality: Mental Illness,
Employment Discrimination, and the Americans with Disabilities Act,
17 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 79 (2006) (discussing the problems
with differentiating between mental illness and disfavored personality);
See generally Wendy F. Hensel, Interacting with Others: A Major Life
Activity Under the Americans with Disabilities Act?, 2002 WIS. L. REV.
1139 (2002) (arguing that interacting with others should constitute a
major life activity). See generally Mark DeLoach, Note, Can’t We All
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major life activities.161 Courts were also generally unsympathetic to
mentally ill employees who claimed that they were substantially
limited in the major life activity of working.162 Additional cases held
that an employee who suffered from a panic disorder was not
substantially limited in the major life activity of everyday mobility163
and a depressed employee with a sleep disturbance was not
substantially limited in a major life activity.164
Under the ADAAA’s more expansive definitions of “substantially
limits” and “major life activity,” impairments associated with mental
illness are now more likely to be considered disabilities.
The
ADAAA’s illustrative list of major life activities includes
“concentrating, thinking, communicating and working”165 which are
activities commonly associated with mental illness. Further, the
statute’s list of major bodily functions includes neurological and brain

Just Get Along?: The Treatment of “Interacting with Others” as a
Major Life Activity in the Americans with Disabilities, 57 VAND. L. REV.
1313, 1331-35 (2004) (discussing the difficulty plaintiffs face in cases
where they claim a substantial limitation in the ability to get along with
others). See also, e.g., Soileau v. Gulford of Me., Inc., 105 F.3d 12, 15
(1st Cir. 1997) (holding that the ability to get along with others is not a
major life activity). Davis v. Univ. of N.C., 263 F.3d 95, 101-02 (4th
Cir. 2001) (expressing in footnote 4 doubt as to whether the ability to
get along with others was a major life activity). But see Jacques v.
DiMarzio, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 2d 151, 160 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (determining
that getting along with others is a major life activity).
161. See, e.g., Pack v. Kmart Corp., 166 F.3d 1300, 1305 (10th Cir. 1999)
cert. denied, 528 U.S. 811 (1999) (holding that concentrating is not a
major life activity); Korn, supra note 38, at 599 n. 95.
162. See, e.g., Jerina v. Richardson Auto., Inc., 960 F. Supp 106, 108-09
(N.D.Tex. 1997) (explaining that plaintiff who suffered from a number
of mental disorders including depression and panic disorder was not
substantially limited in his ability to work); Johnson v. N.Y. Med. Coll.,
1997 WL 580708 at *7 (S.D.NY. 1997) (describing an employee who was
hospitalized for depression was not substantially limited in her ability to
work). Prior to passage of the ADAAA the Supreme Court expressed
skepticism as to whether work could be a major life activity, and stated
that a plaintiff would need to be substantially limited in a broad class of
jobs and not simply the particular job he or she applied for or currently
held. See Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 119 S.Ct. 2139, 2148 (1999).
163. See Reeves v. Johnson Controls World Services, Inc., 140 F.3d 144, 149
-51 (2d Cir. 1998). For a discussion of this case see Parikh, supra note
51, at 746-47.
164. Smoke v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 98-1370, 200 WL 192806 at *2
(10th Cir. Feb. 17, 2000).
165. 42 § U.S.C. 12102(2)(A).
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function.166 The 2011 EEOC Guidelines further clarify that the term
mental impairment should be interpreted broadly.167 Post-ADAAA
cases have generally found that mentally ill employees have at least
raised a genuine issue of material fact as whether they are
substantially limited in a major life activity.168
E. “Regarded As” Prong
The ADAAA also broadened coverage under the ADA’s “regarded
as” prong.169 Prior to passage of the ADAAA, a plaintiff could only
meet the “regarded as” standard if he could show that his employer
166. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B). The EEOC Guidelines specifically list “major
depressive disorder, bipolar disorder, post-traumatic disorder, obsessivecompulsive disorder and schizophrenia” as examples of disorders that
would substantially limit brain function. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(iii)
(2012).
167. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(2) (2012) (stating that a mental impairment
means “[a]ny mental or psychological disorder, such as an intellectual
disability (formerly termed ‘mental retardation’), organic brain
syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific learning
disabilities.”).
168. See, e.g., Glaser v. Gap, 994 F. Supp.2d 569, 575-76 (S.D.N.Y 2014)
(determining that employee raised a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether autism substantially limited a major life activity); Santee v.
Lehigh Valley Health Network Inc., 2013 WL 6697865 at *4–5 (E.D. Pa.
Dec. 19, 2013) (holding that plaintiff who suffered from depression was
disabled because of her substantial limitation in the major life activity
of concentrating); Bracken v. DASKO Home Med. Equip., Inc., No.
1:12–CV–892, 2014 WL 4388261 at *9-10 (S.D. Ohio, Sep. 5, 2014)
(determining that plaintiff who suffered from depression, anxiety and
possible bipolar disorder was substantially limited in the major life
activities of sleeping and eating); Beair v. Summit Polymers, No. 5:11420-KKC, 2013 WL 4099196 (E.D. Ky., Aug. 13, 2013) (determining
that plaintiff with major depressive disorder and PTSD had substantial
limitations in brain function); Naber v. Dover Healthcare Associates,
Inc., 765 F. Supp. 2d 622, 646 (D. Del. 2011) (holding that depression
substantially limited the major life activity of sleeping); Holland v.
Shinseki, No. 3:10-CV-0908-B, 2012 WL 162333, at 6 (N.D. Tex. Jan.
18, 2012) (genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether employee
whose suffered from a number of mental disorders including depression,
anxiety and acute stress and was unable to sleep more than an hour a
night was substantially limited in a major life activity). But see
Blackard v. Livingston Parish Sewer District, No. 12-704-SDD-RLB,
2014 WL 199629 (M.D. La., Jan. 15, 2014) (holding that plaintiff who
suffered from bipolar disorder, depression, anxiety and ADHD did not
demonstrate that she was substantially limited in a major life activity).
169. See Hoffman, supra note 157, at 1496 (“The revised ‘regarded as’ prong
of the disability definition is likely to be the most transformative
improvement for ADA plaintiffs.”). For a general discussion of the
ADAAA’s broad coverage under the regarded as prong see Diller, supra
note 13, at 223-27.
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believed that he had an impairment that substantially limited a major
life activity.170 In other words, it was not enough for an employee to
show that his employer viewed him as impaired but rather the
employee had to prove that the employer specifically believed that the
impairment substantially limited a major life activity. Employees
were therefore required to “get inside the head” of the employer and
prove the employer’s motivation.171 Additionally, employees were not
protected in cases of “pure” discrimination or animus-based
discrimination where the employer’s actions were taken “out of deep
antipathy for the diagnosed condition rather than any mistaken
perception of its effects on an individual’s ability to work.”172 In other
words, it was OK for an employer to fire an employee with bipolar
disorder because he did not like people with bipolar disorder. Both
physically and mentally disabled plaintiffs fared poorly under the
“regarded as” prong in pre-ADAAA cases.173
The ADAAA significantly expands the “regarded as” prong of the
definition of disabled.174 Under the ADAAA, an individual is regarded
as disabled “if the individual established that he or she has been
subjected to an action prohibited under this Act because of an actual
or perceived physical or mental impairment whether or not the
impairment limits or is perceived to limit a major life activity.”175
Employees therefore no longer need to show that their employer
viewed them as functionally limited in performing a major life
activity.176 The legislative history further clarifies that Congress
170. Concannon, supra note 19, at 104.
171. Id. at 95.
172. Stefan, supra note 58, at 298–99.
173. For example, in pre-ADAAA cases employees with cosmetic
disfigurement were often denied protection under the ADA since they
were not substantially limited in a major life activity, while in postADAAA cases they would generally be regarded as disabled. Hoffman,
supra note 157, at 1496–97. Similarly, in pre-ADAAA cases, a number of
courts held that employees who suffered from anxiety and depression
were not “regarded as” disabled since they were unable to show that
their employer believed they were substantially limited in a major life
activity. See, e.g., Parikh, supra note 51, at 753-56; Concannon, supra
note 19, at 112; Stefan, supra note 58, at 276; Schwartz v. Comex, No.
96 CIV. 3386 LAP, 1997 WL 187353, at 2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 1997).
174. Carol J. Miller, EEOC Reinforces Broad Interpretation of ADAAA
Disability Qualification: But What Does “Substantially Limit” Mean?,
76 MO. L. REV. 43, 68 (2011).
175. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(A); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3) (stating that evidence
that an employer believed the individual was limited in any major life
activity is not required).
176. See Befort, supra note 1, at 2044. See also 154 CONG. REC. S8342-46
(daily ed. Sept. 11, 2008) (Explaining that the “regarded as” prong “will
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intended for the ADAAA to cover animus based types of
discrimination.177 Congress did include two important statutory
limitations as a compromise for this broad coverage.178 First, the
“regarded as” prong “does not apply to impairments that are
Second, employers do not need to
transitory and minor.”179
reasonably accommodate employees who are regarded as disabled, but
only need to accommodate employees who have an actual impairment
that substantially limits a major life activity.180
The expectation was that the expanded “regarded as” prong
would lead to a “greater prevalence of prong three claims following
the effective date of the ADAAA.”181 However, according to one
study, this has not occurred and the author of the study hypothesized
two possible reasons for this surprising finding.182 First, it is possible
that employers are not challenging plaintiff’s coverage under this
prong since it is unlikely the challenge will be successful. Another
possibility is that plaintiffs who need an accommodation do not assert
coverage under the “regarded as” prong since employers are not
required to reasonably accommodate an employee under this prong.
While there may not be a greater prevalence of claims under the
“regarded as” prong, courts that have addressed this prong have
applied it in a relatively clear and consistent manner.183 The
expanded prong is likely to have a positive impact on mentally ill
employees due to the pervasiveness of negative stereotypes and
stigmas commonly associated with mental illness.184 Mentally ill
apply to impairments, not only to disabilities. As such, it does not
require a functional test to determine whether an impairment
substantially limits a major life activity.”).
177. Stefan, supra note 58, at 304–06; Diller, supra note 13, at 272-75.
178. Befort, supra note 1, at 2044.
179. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(B) (Under the terms of the Act a “transitory
impairment” is “an impairment with an actual or expected duration of 6
months or less.”).
180. 42 U.S.C. § 12201(h). This statutory limitation makes sense since
employees who are regarded as disabled – but do not actually have a
disability – are unlikely to need an accommodation.
181. See Befort, supra note 1, at 2052. This study examined summary
judgment decisions addressing whether the employee was “disabled” as
well as whether the employee was “qualified for the job” over a 40
month period from January 1, 2010 to April 30, 2013.
182. Id. at 2063-64.
183. As one scholar explained, “[P]erhaps because the revision replaced a
thorny and complicated determination with a more straightforward one,
the courts seem to have absorbed and applied it rather smoothly.”
Burgdorf, supra note 110, at 78.
184. See infra Part III.B.
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plaintiffs are now able to at least raise a genuine issue of material fact
as to whether they were “regarded as” disabled by their employer in
many of these cases.185 However, employees still must show
“causation” or that they were subjected to an adverse action “because
of” the perceived impairment,186 and in some cases mentally ill
plaintiffs have been unable to meet this burden.187
As this Part has explained, the ADAAA both generally states
that the term disability should be broadly construed and also
specifically expands and clarifies the term. As a result, this expanded
definition of disability has increased the likelihood that mentally ill
employees will have standing under the ADA. However, there are a
number of remaining hurdles that disabled employees—and
particularly mentally ill employees—still face under the statute that
will be discussed in the next Part.
V. Limitations of the ADAAA
As explained in the previous Part, the ADAAA’s broadened
definition of disability has expanded coverage for employees with
impairments, including mentally ill employees. In post-ADAAA
decisions, courts are granting significantly fewer summary judgment
rulings to employers based on disability status alone.188 As a result,
185. See, e.g., Becker v. Elmwood Local School District, 2012 WL 13569, at
*10 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 4, 2012) (holding that there was a factual dispute
as to whether the employer perceived an employee with OCD as
disabled); Bracken v. DASKO Home Med. Equip., Inc., No. 1:12–CV–
892, 2014 WL 4388261 at *12 (S.D. Ohio, Sep. 5, 2014) (holding that
there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether employer
regarded employee as disabled since employer was aware of employee’s
mental impairment and symptoms of impairment); McCracken v.
Carlton College, 969 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1130 (D. Minn. 2013) (holding
that employee who suffered from anxiety and depression met the
“minimal burden of establishing that he was regarded as disabled”);
Nelson v. City of New York, 2013 No. 11 Civ. 2732(JPO), WL 4437224
at *6 (S.D.N.Y.) (holding that employee who suffered from depression
and anxiety raised an issue of fact as to her employer regarding her as
disabled); Stranzl v. Delaware County, No. 13-1393, 2014 WL 3418996,
at *7 (E.D.Pa.) (holding that employer regarded employee with anxiety
attacks, panic attacks and depression as disabled). But see McNally v.
Aztar Indiana Gaming Co., LLC, No. 3:12-CV-00063-TWP, 2014 WL
300433, at 3 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 28, 2014) (determining that even though
employer suggested counseling for employee’s personal problems, this
did not show that employer regarded him as having a mental disability).
186. 29 C.F.R. 1630.2(j)(3)(ii).
187. Banaszack v. Ten Sixteen Recovery Network, No. 12-12433, 2013 WL
2623882, at *6 (E.D. Mich. 2013) (holding that mentally ill employee
failed to demonstrate that her perceived impairment was a “but-for
cause” of why she was fired).
188. Befort, supra note 1, at 2031-32.
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courts are now grappling with the question of whether these disabled
employees were discriminated against in the workplace. As explained
in Part II, in order to establish a prima facie case of disability
discrimination under Title I of the ADA a plaintiff must show that he
is “(1) a disabled person as defined by the ADA; (2) is qualified, with
or without a reasonable accommodation, to perform the essential
functions of the job held or desired; and (3) suffered discrimination by
an employer or prospective employer because of that disability.”189
Since courts are less likely to grant summary judgment to the
employer on the issue of disability status alone, more courts are
addressing the second and third prongs of the prima facie case. This
Part will examine some of the hurdles employees face under the
second and third prong.

A.

Formal Equality and the Courts’ General Discomfort with
Accommodation
Accommodation requirements under the ADA should be examined
within the general framework of antidiscrimination law in the United
States. While a full discussion of the theories of equality is beyond the
scope of this paper, it is important to understand that “formal
equality” is the underlying principle of antidiscrimination law in the
United States.190 As one commentator explained, “The canonical idea
of ‘antidiscrimination’ in the United States condemns the differential
treatment of similarly situated individuals” on the basis of protected
categories.191 Under both the United States Constitution and Title
VII of the 1964 Civil Right Act, the guiding principle of
antidiscrimination law is that “like individuals” should be treated in a
similar manner.
Courts tend to generally view employment
discrimination statutes as requiring little more than formal equality or
neutrality and are hesitant to require what they consider to be
189. E.E.O.C. v. Picture People, Inc., 684 F.3d 981, 985 (10th Cir. 2012).
190. For a general discussion of theories of equality see Bradley A. Areheart,
The Anticlassification Turn in Employment Discrimination Law, 63
ALA, L. REV. 955, 962 (2012) (arguing that employment discrimination
statutes have recently focused more strongly on anticlassification
principles); Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 115
HARV. L. REV. 642, 645 (2001) (discussing how “antidiscrimination and
accommodation are overlapping rather than fundamentally distinct
categories, despite the frequent claims of commentators to the
contrary”); Martha Albertson Fineman, Beyond Identities: The Limits
of an Antidiscrimination Approach to Equality, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1713,
1724-25 (2012) (comparing the legal culture of equality in the United
States with the legal culture of equality in other constitutional
democracies).
191. Jolls, supra note 190, at 643.
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differential or preferential treatment of employees.192 There are
exceptions where statutes193 or court decisions194 mandate
accommodation or “differential” treatment of individuals. However,
courts are generally more comfortable prohibiting discrimination than
they are in mandating accommodation and as a result employees tend
to fare poorly in accommodation cases.195
The statute addressing “differential” treatment that is most
similar to the ADA is §701(j) of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act which mandates religious accommodation in the workplace. Under
§701(j), an employer must “reasonably accommodate an employee’s or
prospective employee’s religious observance or practice” if
accommodation can be done without “undue hardship.” Decisions
interpreting §701(j) illustrate the courts’ general discomfort with
accommodation.196 While religion is defined broadly under §701(j), the
United States Supreme Court has twice addressed the scope of §701(j)
and has both times narrowly defined an employer’s obligation to
accommodate a religious employee.197 In narrowly interpreting §701(j),
the Court specifically defined undue hardship as any cost greater than
“de minimis.”198 When Congress enacted the ADA, it explicitly
rejected 701(j)’s “de minimis” standard, determining instead that
“undue hardship” is an “action requiring significant difficulty or
192. Karen Engle, The Persistence of Neutrality: The Failure of the Religious
Accommodation Provision to Redeem Title VII, 76 TEX. L. REV. 317,
320 (1997) (“Title VII’s prohibition of discrimination has generally been
read as requiring that employers apply workplace requirements and
regulations ‘neutrally.’”).
193. For example, the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA) (29
U.S.C. §§2612) mandates unpaid medical and family leave in certain
circumstances and §701(j) of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act (42
U.S.C. § 2000(e)(j)) requires that employers “reasonably accommodate”
an employee’s religious observance when such accommodation can be
done without “undue hardship.”
194. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343-44 (2003) (upholding
an affirmative action policy and holding that public universities could
consider race as a factor in admissions) (distinguishing that this was an
equal protection case and not an employment discrimination case).
195. See Michael Waterstone, The Untold Story of the Rest of the Americans
with Disabilities Act, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1807, 1819-20 (2005) (explaining
that courts dislike accommodation since they view it as an “unwelcome
species of affirmative action”).
196. See generally Jamie Darin Prenkert & Julie Manning Magid, A Hobson’s
Choice Model for Religious Accommodation, 43 AM. BUS. L.J. 467, 47386 (2006); Kaminer, supra note 16, at 578-79; Engel, supra note 192.
197. See TWA, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, at 73-74, 79-81 (1977); Ansonia
Bd. Of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 69 (1986).
198. TWA, Inc., 432 U.S. at 84.
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expense.”199 However, as will be explained in the next subpart, courts
have nonetheless failed to require significant accommodation of
employees in ADAAA cases.
In addition to being uncomfortable with accommodation
generally, courts explicitly distinguish between mutable and
immutable traits in the workplace and generally do not mandate
Employees therefore fare
accommodation of mutable traits.200
particularly poorly in cases where courts consider the characteristic at
issue to simply be a matter of personal choice. For example, plaintiffs
regularly lose in cases where an employer’s dress or grooming
requirements are challenged under Title VII’s prohibition on sex201 or
race202 discrimination. Courts have also held that “English only” rules
are not national origin discrimination since employees can choose
Commentators have criticized the
what language to speak.203
mutable/immutable distinction opining not only that some mutable
traits should be protected but additionally that some traits that
courts have determined are mutable are in fact immutable.204 Yet
199. H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 68 (1990) (“The Committee wishes to
make it clear that the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court in
TWA v. Hardison, U.S. 63 (1977) are not applicable to this legislation.
In Hardison, the Supreme Court concluded that under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 an employer need not accommodate persons
with religious beliefs if the accommodation would require more than a de
minimis cost for the employer. By contrast, under the ADA, reasonable
accommodations must be provided unless they rise to the level of
‘requiring significant difficulty or expense’ on the part of the employer,
in light of the factors noted in the statute—i.e., a significantly higher
standard than that articulated in Hardison.”).
200. See generally Hoffman, supra note 157; Engel, supra note 192, at 408;
Roberto Gonzalez, Cultural Rights and the Immutability Requirement in
Disparate Impact Doctrine, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2195, 2199 (2003); Debbie
N. Kaminer, Religious Conduct and the Immutability Requirement:
Title VII’s Failure to Protect Religious Employees in the Workplace, 17
VA. J. OF SOC. POL’Y & L. 453, 454 (2010).
201. See generally Katherine T. Bartlett, Only Girls Wear Barrettes: Dress
and Appearance Standards, Community Norms and Workplace Equality,
92 MICH. L. REV. 2451, n. 196 (1994); Engle, supra note 192, at 340-53.
202. See Rogers v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 229, 231-32 (S.D.N.Y.
1981).
203. See, e.g., Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 270 (5th Cir. 1980).
204. See Mark R. Bandsuch, Dressing Up Title VII’s Analysis of Workplace
Appearance Policies, 40 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 287 (2009)
(criticizing courts for their overemphasis on the immutability standard);
Tristan K. Green, Discomfort at Work:
Workplace Assimilation
Demands and the Contract Hypothesis, 86 N.C. L. REV. 379 (2008)
(discussing how the debate on workplace equality should be reframed to
include the goal of social equality); Susan Sturm, Second Generation
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despite these critiques, courts tend to regularly hold that immutable
traits are not entitled to accommodation.205
Requests for accommodation under the ADAAA must be
examined within this general framework of antidiscrimination law in
the United States. First, courts are generally unsympathetic to an
employee’s requests for “differential treatment” or accommodation,
and this is a hurdle that will be faced by employees who request
accommodation under the ADAAA.206 Second, one of the stereotypes
involving mental illness is that it is not a real disease but rather a
somewhat mutable characteristic.207 Mentally ill individuals are often
stigmatized as choosing to behave in an undesirable manner.
Additionally, there is the stereotype that mentally ill individuals are
simply malingerers, actively choosing to deceive others.208 Finally, the
definition of what constitutes a mental illness is somewhat illusive and
continually in flux, which further contributes to the view that mental
illness is mutable.209 According to this line of reasoning, it is not only
patients who could “choose” to behave in a more desirable manner,
but also the doctors who get to “choose” how to define mental
illness.210
B.
When is a Mentally Ill Individual “Qualified?”
This Part will discuss both the definition of “qualified” and the
specific application of “qualified” status to mentally ill employees.
Under the ADA both physically and mentally ill employees must be
“qualified” for the job in question. However, mentally ill employees
face unique hurdles in proving “qualified” status and are more likely
than physically ill employees to have their ADA claim fail because
they are not deemed “qualified.”
1. Definition of Qualified Individual
In post-ADAAA cases, courts are significantly more likely to find
that an employee meets the statutory definition of disabled and
therefore more likely to address the second prong of the prima facie
case, which is whether the employee “is qualified, with or without a
Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L.
REV. 458, 462-63 (2001) (proposing a structural approach to the
problem of second generation employment discrimination).
205. See supra note 198.
206. See Waterstone, supra note 195, at 1819-20 (explaining that courts
dislike accommodation since they view it as an “unwelcome species of
affirmative action”).
207. See infra Part III.C.1.
208. Id.
209. See infra Part III.A.
210. Id.
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reasonable accommodation, to perform the essential functions of the
One recent study found that “district court summary
job.”211
judgment rulings based on qualified status as compared to all district
court summary judgment rulings” went from 28% in pre-ADAAA
cases to 47% in post-ADAAA cases.212 In addition to more courts
reaching the issue of qualified status, courts are also more likely to
find that employees are unqualified in the post-ADAAA cases.213
While summary judgment was granted to the employer in 47.9% of
cases that ruled on the qualified issue in pre-ADAAA cases, this
number increased to a 69.7% employer win rate in post-ADAAA cases
that ruled on the qualified issue.214 Therefore, while plaintiffs are now
more likely to have “disability” standing, they are also more likely to
lose at the summary judgment stage based on “qualified status.” As
the author of the study opined, as a result of the shift in focus to
“qualified” status, “the more plaintiff-friendly outcomes engineered by
the ADAAA with respect to disability status are being partially offset
by more employer-friendly outcomes with respect to qualified
status.”215
In defining essential functions, the ADA specifically states that
“consideration shall be given to the employer’s judgment as to what
functions of the job are essential,”216 and courts tend to give deference
to an employer’s determination.217 The EEOC regulations both
reiterate that the term does not include “marginal” functions of the
job and also provide a non-exclusive list of factors employers should
consider in determining if a function is essential.218 However, it is
somewhat unclear when something rises to the level of being an
“essential function.” For example, while many courts have held that
regular attendance is always an essential job function, some have
taken a more fact specific approach.219
Closely related to the definition of the term “essential functions”

211. E.E.O.C. v. Picture People, Inc., 684 F.3d 981, 985 (10th Cir. 2012).
212. Befort, supra note 1, at 2054-55.
213. Id. at 2025.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 2071.
216. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 § U.S.C. 12111(8) (2012).
217. Ward v. Mass. Health Research Inst. Inc., 209 F.3d 29, 34 (1st Cir.
2000); Mason v. Avaya Commc’ns Inc., 357 F.3d 1114, 1119 (10th Cir.
2004); Mulloy v. Acushnet Co., 460 F.3d 141, 147 (1st Cir. 2006).
218. 29 C.F.R. 1630.2(n)(3).
219. Concannon, supra note 19, at 97.
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is the definition of the term “reasonable accommodation,”220 and as
explained in the previous subpart, courts tend to be uncomfortable
with preferences or statutory mandates of accommodation. Under the
ADA, an employer must make “reasonable accommodations to the
known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified
individual with a disability who is an applicant or employee, unless
such covered entity can demonstrate that the accommodation would
impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business.”221 The
ADA does not define “reasonable accommodation,” but instead gives
examples of possible accommodations which include “job
restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to a
vacant position [and] acquisition or modification of equipment or
devices.”222 Undue hardship is defined as “an action requiring
significant difficulty or expense.”223 The EEOC regulations provide
further examples of possible accommodations as well as when
accommodations would constitute an undue hardship.224
The reasonable accommodation provision of the ADA has not
been interpreted by the courts in a clear and consistent manner.225
U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, the only Supreme Court case that has
interpreted this provision, held that an accommodation that violates a
seniority system would generally not be considered reasonable.226
220. See generally Nicole Buonocore Porter, Martinizing Title I of the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 47 GA. L. REV. 57 (2013) (discussing
how the framework used by the Supreme Court in PGA Tour Inc. v.
Martin can be used to develop a coherent framework for deciding Title I
ADA cases); Mark C. Weber, Unreasonable Accommodation and Due
Hardship, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1119, 1133 (2010) (discussing how reasonable
accommodation and undue hardship are “two sides of the same coin”);
see Carlos A. Ball, Preferential Treatment and Reasonable
Accommodation Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 55 ALA. L.
REV. 951, 974 (2004).
221. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C § 12112(b)(5)(A)
(2012).
222. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (2012).
223. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(A)
(2012).
224. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)-(p). For a detailed discussion of the legislative
history and EEOC interpretation of the terms “reasonable
accommodation” and “undue hardship” see Weber, supra note 220, at
1131-42.
225. One commentator referred to it as “the chaos of the interpretation of
the reasonable accommodation provision.” See Porter, supra note 220, at
543.
226. U.S Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 406 (2002). The Court did
state that under “special circumstances” an accommodation that
violates a seniority system might be reasonable. Id.
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Most lower courts have found that employers do not need to create
positions for disabled employees, provide accommodations of a
personal nature such as medications or hearing aids, or monitor an
employee’s health needs.227 However, it is unclear whether other
accommodations would be unreasonable.228 For example, the lower
courts are split on the questions of whether an employer needs to
provide an employee with work-related transportation229 and whether
an employer must consider an employee’s request to work from
home.230 Courts are also split on the question of whether an employer
must reassign an employee to a vacant position if there are other
more qualified employees available for the position,231 and whether
accommodations that burden other employees should be required.232
Courts have not consistently required a high level of accommodation
of disabled employees.
2. Application of “Qualified” Status to Mentally Ill Employees
The shift in focus from “disability status” to “qualified status” is
likely to have a larger impact on mentally disabled employees than on
physically disabled employees. As previously explained, one study
found that both physically and mentally disabled plaintiffs in preADAAA cases had a similar level of difficulty establishing class

227. See Porter, supra note 220, at 546–47 (citing cases).
228. For a discussion of lower court cases interpreting the accommodation
provision of the ADA see id. at 543–58; Weber, supra note 220, at 115260.
229. Compare Wade v. Gen. Motors Corp., 165 F.3d 29, at 2 (6th Cir. 1998)
(employer is not obligated to provide accommodation so that employee
is able to work night shifts), with Lyons v. Legal Aid Society, 68 F.3d
1512, 1517 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that an employer could be obligated
to accommodate an employee with difficulty getting to work).
230. Compare Mobley v. Allstate Ins. Co., 531 F.3d 539, 547-48 (7th Cir.
2008) (holding that working at home is generally not a reasonable
accommodation), with Langon v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 959
F.2d 1053, 1061 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (analyzing whether it would be
possible for disabled employee to work at home since her OCD only
made it difficult for her to leave the house and did not affect her ability
to do her work).
231. Compare Smith v. Midland Brake Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1154 (10th Cir.
1999) (disabled employee should be transferred to a vacant position
even if more qualified employees apply), with Huber v. Walmart Stores,
Inc., 486 F.3d 480, 480 (8th Cir. 2007), cert. granted in part, 552 U.S.
1074 (2007), cert. dismissed, 522 U.S. 1136 (2008) (employer did not
need to transfer employee to vacant position if more qualified employees
applied for the position). See also Porter, supra, note 220, at 540-41.
232. Id. at 552 (citing cases).
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membership.233 However, individuals with mental impairments were
more likely to fail because they were not deemed “qualified” while
individuals with physical disabilities were more likely to fail because
they were not deemed “disabled.”234 A second study involving a
different set of cases also found that mentally impaired individuals
fared worse than physically impaired individuals in pre-ADAAA cases
based on qualified status.235 This study found that in post-ADAAA
cases physically and mentally ill employees fare equally poorly, but
the author cautioned that it involved a much smaller sample of
cases.236 In other words, the biggest hurdle to mentally ill employees
had been “qualified status,” and this hurdle remains unchanged.
In many cases, the question of whether a mentally ill employee is
qualified hinges on whether the employee is able to perform the job
with a reasonable accommodation. A preliminary issue with
reasonable accommodation is that the employer must be aware of the
employee’s disability and need for accommodation. As explained in
Part III, mentally ill employees are less likely to request an
accommodation than physically disabled employees either because
they are unaware that they are ill or because they are actively hiding
their disorder as a result of the stigma associated with mental
illness.237
One accommodation issue that has come up in a number of both
pre-ADAAA and post-ADAAA cases involving mentally ill employees
is the employees’ difficulty getting along with others.238 This often
occurs in cases where an employee suffers from depression and
anxiety.239 A common accommodation requested by employees who
233. Hensel & Jones, supra note 63, at 65-69 (indicating that while plaintiffs
with mental disabilities were slightly less likely to establish class
membership than plaintiffs with physical disabilities, the difference was
not statistically significant).
234. See supra notes 113-119 and accompanying text.
235. Befort, supra note 1, at 2056.
236. Id.
237. See supra Part III.B.
238. See supra Part IV.D (explaining how in pre-ADAAA cases, courts
struggled with whether the ability to get along with others was a major
life activity and often found that it was not. In post-ADAAA cases these
employees are more likely to be found to be disabled).
239. See, e.g., Palmerini v. Fidelity Brokerage Servs. LLC, No. 12-CV-505JD, 2014 WL 3401826, at *3 (D.N.H. Jul. 9, 2014) (employee suffered
from post-traumatic stress disorder, a form of anxiety and depression);
Beair v. Summit Polymers, No. 5:11-420-KKC, 2013 WL 4099196 (E.D.
Ky., Aug. 13, 2013) (employee suffered from anxiety and depression);
Schwarzkopf v. Brunswick Corp., 833 F. Supp.2d 1106, 1109 (D. Minn.
2011) (employee suffered from depression and general anxiety disorder);
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have difficulty getting along with others is a transfer away from the
colleague they are having a conflict with, since psychiatric disabilities
can be exacerbated by environmental stressors. Courts tend to be
very unsympathetic to these requests and routinely hold that
transferring an employee away form a manager or coworker who is
causing stress or conflict is not a reasonable accommodation.240 As
courts have explained, nothing in the ADA gives an employee the
right to demand a “work environment without aggravation”241 or to
Employees who are having trouble
control who he works with.242
getting along with their colleagues or supervisors also sometimes
request that the employer instruct other employees to modify their
behavior. Courts routinely hold that it not reasonable for an employee
to demand that an employer instruct coworkers or managers to
change their behavior.243
Employees who suffer from mental illness also commonly request
a modified work schedule because their current work schedule is
Prichard v. Dominguez, 2006 No. 3:05cv40 WL 1836017 at *13 (N.D.
Fla. June 29, 2006) (employee suffered from dysthymia, a form of
depression); Gaul v. Lucent Tech., Inc., 134 F.3d 576, 577 (3rd Cir.
1998) (employee suffered from depression and anxiety related disorders).
240. See, e.g., Whalen v. City of Syracuse, No. 5:11-CV-0794, 2014 WL
3529976, slip op. at 7, (N.D.N.Y. Jul. 15, 2014) (holding that it is not a
reasonable accommodation to guarantee that plaintiff with depression
and anxiety will never have contact with colleague who triggers these
conditions); Palmerini, 2014 WL 3401826, at *8 (holding that it is not
reasonable for an employee to ask for multiple reassignments based on
his inability to get along with his managers); Beair, 2013 WL 4099196
(holding that it is not reasonable accommodation to transfer an
employee to a position so she will be subject to less supervision);
Schwarzkopf v. Brunswick Corp., 833 F. Supp.2d 1106, 1123 (D. Minn.
2011) (stating that it is not reasonable for an employee to ask for a
transfer because of difficulty getting along with other coworkers);
Prichard v. Dominguez, 2006 WL 1836017 at *13 (N.D.. Fla. June 29,
2006) (discussing the “overwhelming unanimity of opinions in courts”
that under the ADA it is unreasonable to request a transfer away from
an undesirable boss); Gaul, 134 F.3d at 579 (holding that it is
unreasonable for an employee to ask for a transfer away from coworkers
and colleagues who cause him stress).
241. Palmerini, 2014 WL 3401826 at *7.
242. Prichard, 2006 WL 1836017 at *13.
243. See, e.g., Tomlinson v. Wiggins, No. 12–CV–1050, 2013 WL 2151537
(W.D. Ark. May 16, 2013) (holding that it is not a reasonable
accommodation for employee to request that his boss change his “harsh
management style” since employee is not entitled to a stress-free
environment); Schwarzkopf v. Brunswick Corp., 833 F. Supp.2d 1106
(D. Minn. 2011) (stating that it is unreasonable for a mentally ill
employee to request that his boss and colleagues be instructed not to
yell at him).
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unfeasible as a result of their illness. This is an issue in both preADAAA and post-ADAAA cases and may include a request for
reassignment to another position or permission to work from home.
The lower courts have generally agreed that employers do not need to
create positions for disabled employees, and mentally ill employees
tend to lose in cases where they request a shortened or part-time work
week and no part-time positions are available.244 Courts have also
routinely held that regular attendance at work is an essential job
function and employers are not required to accommodate an
employee’s inability to consistently arrive at work on time as a result
of mental illness.245 It is unclear whether an employer needs to
reassign a mentally ill employee to a vacant position if there are other
more qualified employees available for the position.246 It is also unclear
if a court would require an employer to consider a mentally ill
employee’s request to work at home.247
Another issue that arises more often with mentally ill employees
than with physically ill employees is employee misconduct or
inappropriate behavior since mental illness is more likely than
physical illness to manifest itself in the form of conduct.248 Courts in
244. See Treanor v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 200 F.3d 570, 575 (8th Cir.
2000) (holding that ADA did not require employer to create a part-time
position for employee who suffered from depression); Lamb v. Qualex,
Inc., 28 F. Supp. 2d 374, 379 (W.D. Va. 1998) (holding that ADA did
not require employer to create a part-time position for employee
suffering from depression).
245. Dorgan v. Suffolk Community College, 2014 WL 3858395 (E.D.N.Y.
August 4, 2014) (holding that employer does not need to further
accommodate employee with bipolar disorder who was unable to arrive
at work on time despite modifications to her schedule); Blackard, 2014
WL 199619 at 6 (holding that employer did not need to switch an
employee who suffered from bipolar disorder, depression, anxiety and
ADHD to the day shift since employee would be unable to consistently
arrive to work on time even with the accommodation).
246. Compare Smith v. Midland Brake Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1154 (10th Cir.
1999) (disabled employee should be transferred to a vacant position
even if more qualified employees apply), with Huber v. Walmart Stores,
Inc., 486 F.3d 480, 480 (8th Cir. 2007), cert. granted in part, 552 U.S.
1074 (2007), cert. dismissed, 522 U.S. 1136 (2008) (employer did not
need to transfer employee to vacant position if more qualified employees
applied for the position). See also Porter, supra note 220, at 540-41.
247. See, e.g., Langon v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 959 F.2d 1053,
1061 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (analyzing whether it would be possible for
disabled employee to work at home since her OCD only made it difficult
for her to leave the house but did not affect her ability to do her work).
248. Karen Dill Danforth, Reading Reasonableness Out of the ADA:
Responding to Threats by Employees with Mental Illness Following
Palmer, 85 VA. L. REV. 661, 677-78 (1999).
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both pre-ADAAA and post-ADAAA cases are generally
unsympathetic to these employees and routinely hold that employers
need not accommodate employee misconduct in the workplace even if
the conduct stems from mental illness.249 In one recent case, an
employee who suffered from bipolar disorder entered the store where
he worked after closing hours, disarmed the alarm, locked himself in
the building, entered the safe, played on computers, and texted the
Regional Manager about where he was and what he was doing.250
After he refused to cooperate with an investigation into his behavior,
he was fired for this conduct by a decision-maker who was unaware he
suffered from bipolar disorder. The court held that since the
employee was fired because of his conduct, the ADA was not
violated.251 The court emphasized that ignoring or excusing employee
misconduct—even if caused by an underlying illness—is not a
reasonable accommodation.252
However, another recent decision was more sympathetic to an
autistic employee’s inappropriate behavior.253 The court denied the
employer’s motion for summary judgment since the employer did not
demonstrate that the employee violated company policy. While the
autistic employee had temporarily blocked an employee in her cubicle,
he moved when she indicated that she needed to leave the cubicle and
the court concluded that the behavior “did not have the type of
sexual undertone that would bring it within the ambit of” the
company’s sexual harassment policy.254 The court essentially held
that an autistic employee’s conduct must be viewed based on his
social limitations.
Perhaps the most serious type of inappropriate conduct in the
workplace involves violence or threats of violence. Courts, in both preADAAA and post-ADAAA cases have consistently held that
employers do not need to tolerate an employee’s violence or threats of
violence in the workplace and can terminate employees who violate
nondiscriminatory workplace policies.255 As the Second Circuit stated,
249. See id. at 679-80 (citing cases); Korn, supra note 38, at 643-46.
250. Yarberry v. Gregg Appliances, Inc., No. 1:12–cv–611–HJW, 2014 WL
4639149 at *1 (S.D. Ohio Sep. 16, 2014).
251. Id.
252. Id. at *5.
253. See Glaser v. Gap Inc., 994 F. Supp. 2d 569, 577 (S.D.N.Y 2014)
(explaining that autism often manifests itself with unusual behavior and
difficulty communicating and socializing).
254. Id. at 579.
255. See, e.g., Snider v. United States Steel-Fairfield Works Med. Dep’t, 25
F.3d 1361, 1368 (N.D. Ala. 2014); Pabon v. New York City Transit
Authority, 703 F. Supp. 2d 188, 202 (E.D.N.Y 2010); Glaser v. Sista v.
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an “employer may discipline or terminate an individual who, because
of a disability, makes a threat against other employees if the same
discipline would be imposed on a non-disabled employee engaged in
the same conduct.”256 Mentally ill employees who engage in such
conduct are not protected by the ADA, even if their actions are
caused by the illness. As the First Circuit explained, “[T]he ADA
does not require an employee whose unacceptable behavior threatens
the safety of others to be retained, even if the behavior stems from a
mental disability.”257
The fact that courts consistently reach this holding is not
surprising since courts are generally unsympathetic to employee
misconduct and workplace violence is a serious concern in the United
States today.
However, as explained in Part III, mentally ill
employees are often stigmatized as violent and it is therefore
important that only those employees who actually threaten or engage
in violence are found to be “unqualified” and rules really are applied
in a “legitimate and nondiscriminatory manner.”
Additionally, as
explained in Part III it is often difficult to predict which employees—
regardless of whether they made threats—will actually engage in
violent behavior in the workplace.
Related to and sometimes confused with the concept of employee
misconduct is the “direct threat” provision of the ADA. The ADA
specifically states that employees who pose “a direct threat to the
health or safety of other individuals in the workplace”258 do not meet
the qualification standards of the ADA. The EEOC Regulations
define a direct threat as “a significant risk of substantial harm to the
health or safety of the individual or others that cannot be eliminated
or reduced by reasonable accommodation.”259 While the direct threat
definition was adopted from a case under the Rehabilitation Act260
that involved an employee with tuberculosis, the legislative history of
the ADA makes clear that this defense covers mental illness as well.261
While there is some case law that confuses the two concepts, the
direct threat defense is distinct from and not meant to be applied in
CDC IXIS North America, Inc., 445 F.3d 161, 171 (2d Cir. April 13,
2006); Glaser v. Sista v. CDC IXIS North America, Inc., 445 F.3d 161,
171 (2d Cir. 2006); Williams v. Motorola Inc., 303 F.3d 1284, 1291 (11th
Cir. 2002).
256. Sista, 445 F.3d at 171.
257. Calef, 322 F.3d at 87.
258. 42 U.S.C. § 12113b (2009).
259. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (r).
260. Sch. Bd. of Nassau Cnty. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 286 n.14 (1987).
261. See H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 485 (1990).
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cases where an employee engages in threatening behavior.262 Rather,
the direct threat defense is meant to be applied in cases involving
“discriminatory application of qualification standards” that “screen
out” disabled individuals.263 As one Court of Appeals explained, this
distinction between posing a threat and engaging in threatening
behavior “maintains the necessary balance between ‘protecting
disabled individuals from discrimination based on prejudice
stereotypes or unfounded fear’…and permitting employers to protect
themselves and their employees and customers from potentially
violent employees.”264 In “direct threat” cases, courts are required to
make an individualized assessment of whether the disabled employee
In enacting the direct threat defense, and
is “qualified.”265
emphasizing the need for an individualized assessment, legislators had
expressed concern that employers would discriminate against mentally
ill employees and assume that they posed a “direct threat” based on
the negative stereotypes of the mentally ill.266
For example, in a recent federal district court case involving a
police officer who suffered from major depression, anxiety and
personality disorders, the court denied summary judgment for the
employer based on the “direct threat” defense since the court could
not “definitely conclude” that the plaintiff was not qualified. 267 The
plaintiff had been on disability leave and applied for reinstatement
which was denied based on her “extensive psychological history” and
“concerns about compromised stress tolerance.”268 This case involved
the “direct threat defense” since the plaintiff had not engaged in any
threatening behavior but rather the employer had determined that
she did not meet the qualification standards for the job. It is
262. See Danforth, supra note 248, at 686 (“The Seventh Circuit, in Palmer
v. Circuit Court, blurred the distinctions between firing an employee
solely for misconduct that violates a nondiscriminatory workplace policy
and deeming an employee ‘not otherwise qualified’ when he poses a
direct threat.”). See also Sista, 445 F.3d at 170-73 (discussing the
difference between an employee’s threatening behavior and an employee
constituting a “direct threat”).
263. Sista, 445 F.3d at 171.
264. Id. at 172.
265. Id.
266. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, at 485 (“Decisions are not permitted to be
based on generalizations about the disability but rather must be based
on the facts of an individual case. For example, an employer may not
assume that a person with a mental disability, or a person who has been
treated for a mental disability, poses a direct threat to others.”).
267. Nelson, 2013 WL 4437224, at *13 (S.D.N.Y).
268. Id. at *4.
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noteworthy that the court did not grant summary judgment to the
City based on the “direct threat” defense because courts are more
likely to defer to employers in cases involving public safety. In fact,
the court noted that the demands placed on police officers are “unique
and extreme” and that lapses in judgment could result in “injury or
death” but nonetheless concluded that the employer failed to meet its
burden.269
C. Adverse Action
In addition to being “disabled” and “qualified,” a claimant must
also meet the third prong of a prima facie case of discrimination under
the ADA, and show that he suffered an adverse action because of his
disability.270 Since claimants are more likely to be found to be
“disabled” in post-ADAAA cases, courts are now more likely to
address the question of whether an employee suffered an adverse
action because of his disability. Employees face a number of hurdles
under this third prong of the prima facie case.
Prior to passage of the ADAAA, employees were often
unsuccessful in cases that addressed this third prong of the ADA.271
A number of cases determined that actions taken by the employer did
not rise to the level of constituting an adverse action. For example,
at least two circuit courts held that requiring a mentally disabled
employee to undergo a psychiatric evaluation was not an adverse
employment action.272
A number of post-ADAAA cases have similarly found that the
complained of incident did not rise to the level of being an adverse
action. One recent district court decision found that a number of
incidents that were alleged by a disabled employee—including being
transferred to a different office, failing to have her computer files
transferred, and failing to receive responses to questions regarding
issues with her pay check—did not alone or in aggregate rise to the
level of being an adverse action.273 In another recent case, an employee
who resigned from his position as a teacher—after being told that he
would receive a “non-renewal recommendation” if he did not resign

269. Id. at *11.
270. E.E.O.C. v. Picture People, Inc., 684 F.3d 981, 985 (10th Cir. 2012).
271. See Stefan, supra note 58, at 291.
272. Duda v. Bd. of Educ. of Franklin Park Pub. Sch. Dist., 133 F.3d 1054,
1056, 1060-61 (7th Cir. 1998) (While finding that the plaintiff in this
case suffered an adverse action, court also implied that school district
had been wise in mandating psychiatric evaluations); Sullivan v. River
Valley Sch. Dist., 197 F.3d 804 (6th Cir. 1999).
273. Stranzl, 2014 WL 3418996 at *9–10 (E.D. Pa., July 2014).
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the same day—was not constructively discharged.274 The teacher
believed that he had no choice but to resign since having “his contact
non-renewed…would result in a great inability to get another teacher’s
job.”275
One of the biggest hurdles faced by disabled employees is the
unresolved issue of whether a claimant can bring a “mixed motive”
claim under the ADA, or if instead a claimant is required to show
that the adverse action occurred solely or exclusively because of the
disability.276 Courts that have addressed this issue have relied on the
Supreme Court’s interpretation of other civil rights statutes with
similar language. The Supreme Court has held that under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) a plaintiff must prove
that age was the “but for” cause of the challenged adverse
employment action and not simply that “age was one motivating
factor.”277 Similarly, in retaliation claims brought under Title VII of
the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the Supreme Court has held that a plaintiff
must prove that the unlawful retaliation “was a ‘but-for’ cause of the
adverse action, and not simply a ‘substantial’ or ‘motivating’ factor in
the employer’s decision.”278 The Court reached the conclusion that
the “but-for” standard was appropriate in both of these cases, based
in part on the fact that the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII and
ADEA both make it unlawful to discriminate “because” of certain
criteria. On the other hand, the “mixed motive” standard applies to
claims of discrimination brought under Title VII since Title VII
specifically prohibits discrimination based on protected classes “even
though other factors also motivated” the discrimination.279 In other
words, in discrimination claims brought under Title VII, the
discriminatory action does not need to be based solely or exclusively
on a protected category. It has not been fully resolved whether the
appropriate standard under the ADAAA is the “mixed motive”
standard of discrimination claims under Title VII or the “but-for”
standard of both the ADEA and the anti-retaliation provision of Title
VII.
The majority of cases tend to hold that the appropriate standard
under the ADAAA is the stricter “but-for” standard. In Serwatka v.

274. Becker v. Elmwood Local Sch. Dist., 2012 WL 13569 at *7-8 (N.D. Ohio
Jan. 4, 2012).
275. Id. at *7.
276. Miller, supra note 174, at 71-72.
277. Gross v. FBL Fin. Services, Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 180 (2009).
278. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2533 (2013).
279. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2012).
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Rockwell Automation,280 a case that was decided after enactment of
the ADAAA but applied the pre-ADAAA version of the statute since
the statute is not retroactive, the Seventh Circuit applied the “but
for” standard. The Seventh Circuit explained that “but for” was the
appropriate standard since the ADA prohibited discrimination
“because of” a disability and the Supreme Court had interpreted
similar “because of” language in ADEA as requiring but-for
causation.281 The court specifically noted that the post-ADAAA
version of the statute prohibits discrimination “on the basis” of a
disability and not “because of” a disability and it was unclear whether
“this or any other revision to the statute matters in terms of the
viability of a mixed-motive claim under the ADA.”282 However, in a
later case, the Seventh Circuit found that the “because of” and “on
the basis of” language had the same meaning.283 Furthermore, district
courts in the Seventh Circuit have relied on Serwatka in applying the
stricter but-for standard in post-ADAAA cases.284 Therefore, the “butfor” standard seems to apply in the Seventh Circuit.
The Sixth Circuit similarly applied the “but-for” standard in a
case involving the pre-ADAAA version of the statute.285 In a later
case, the Sixth Circuit noted that its reasoning was the same under
either the “because of” or “on the basis of”286 language. District courts
in the Sixth Circuit, relying on these cases, have applied the “but-for”
standard in post-ADAAA cases.287 At least one district court in the
Fifth Circuit also applied the “but for” standard under the

280. Serwatka v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., 591 F.3d 957, 958, 961 (7th Cir.
2010).
281. Id. at 961-62.
282. Id. at 962 n. 1.
283. Fleishman v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 698 F.3d 598, 603-4 (7th Cir. 2012).
284. See, e.g., EEOC v. Staffmark Inv. LLC, 67 F.3d. 885, 894 (N.D. Ill.
2014; Digiosia v. Aurora Health Care, Inc., 48 F. Supp. 3d 1211, 1220-21
(E.D. Wis. 2014).
285. Lewis v. Humboldt Acquisition Corp. Inc., 681 F.3d 312, 321 (6th Cir.
2012).
286. Nilles v. Givaudan Flavors Corp., 521 Fed.Appx. 364, 368 n. 3 (6th Cir.
2013).
287. Notarnicola v. Johnson Controls, 2014 WL 1304591 at *4 (E.D. Mich.
2014). But see Hilderbrand v. Dollar General Corp., 2013 WL 3761291
(M.D. Tenn. 2013) at *5 (while assuming that the “but for” causation
standard applied since the issue was not in dispute, “the court expressly
[did] not address whether there [was] any meaningful distinction
between the pre-and post-amendment language.”)
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ADAAA.288 Similarly, district courts in the Second Circuit stated in
dicta that “but-for” was likely the appropriate standards in ADAAA
cases, but ultimately determined that they did not need to resolve the
issue.289
While the appropriate causation standard is therefore not fully
resolved, the majority of courts seem to apply the stricter but-for
standard, and hold that the “on the basis of” language of the ADAAA
is similar to the “because of” language of ADEA and the pre-ADAAA
version of the ADA.
One commentator had opined that the
appropriate standard is unclear and that courts might apply the more
lenient “mixed-motive” standard based on the Congressional
declaration that the ADAAA be interpreted broadly.290 However, this
author believes that is unlikely since, as previously mentioned, the
ADAAA’s language is similar to the language in ADEA.
Furthermore, the ADAAA, unlike the anti-discrimination provision of
Title VII, does not contain language that mandates the “mixed
motive” standard. Courts will therefore in all probability continue to
resolve the ambiguity in favor of the stricter but-for standard which
will make it difficult for disabled employees—including mentally ill
employees—to establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the
ADAAA.
One recent district court decision from the Seventh Circuit
addressed the application of the “but-for” standard in a case involving
a mentally ill employee.291 The court held that the plaintiff, who
suffered from bipolar disorder, was not fired as a result of her
disability because the majority of the management committee that
ultimately terminated her employment did not know that she had
bipolar disorder. As a result, the employee’s disability could not
possibly have been the “but-for” cause of the termination.292
Interestingly, the court went out of its way to emphasize that there

288. Johnson v. Benton County Sch. Dist., 926 F. Supp. 2d 899, 904 (N.D.
Miss. 2013).
289. See, e.g., Sherman v. County of Suffolk, 31 F. Supp. 3d 332, 348
(E.D.N.Y. 2014) (stating that the similarity between the because of
language in ADEA and the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII “lends
support to idea that a higher court would apply ‘but for’ causation to
ADA claims”). For a summary of district court decisions in the Second
Circuit that addressed this issue, see id. at *13.
290. Miller, supra note 174, at 72 (“Whether the ADAAA’s general
declaration that Congress intended broad protection for disability claims
will be sufficient to withstand narrow judicial construction is another
ambiguity for future interpretation”).
291. Digiosa, 48 F. Supp. 3d at 1221.
292. Id. at 1221-22.
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was no “discriminatory animus.”293 For example, the court found that
a colleague’s negative comments that the plaintiff had “gone manic”
or was “too manic” did not show requisite causation and were not
discriminatory.294 Since the court could have simply resolved the
causation issue based on the fact that most of the management
committee did not know she was bipolar, it is interesting that the
court chose to emphasize that these possibly derogatory references
were not bias.
D. Summary of the Second and Third Prongs of a Prima Facie Case of
Discrimination
Since employees are more likely to be found to be “disabled”
under the first prong of the prima-facie case in post-ADAAA cases,
courts are increasingly grappling with whether the employee faced
discrimination under the second and third prongs of the prima facie
case. Employees do not consistently fare well under the second prong,
which requires that an employee “is qualified, with or without a
reasonable accommodation, to perform the essential functions of the
job.”295 Courts often determine that employers are not required to
accommodate disabled employees in the workplace.296 One reason for
this is that “formal equality” is the underlying principle of
employment discrimination law in the United States, and courts are
often reluctant to mandate accommodation, or differential treatment,
of employees. Additionally, courts are particularly reluctant to require
the types of accommodation that mentally ill employees may need,
such as a modified work schedule or a transfer away from a colleague
who exacerbates their illness.297 The stereotype of mentally ill
individuals as violent may also lead courts to determine that
accommodation is not required.
Mentally ill employees also do not consistently fare well under the
“adverse action” or third prong of the prima facie case. Some postADAAA cases have determined that the complained of incident does
not rise to the level of being an adverse action. Additionally, the
majority of courts have held that a claimant cannot bring a “mixed
motive” claim under the ADA, but rather must show that their
disability was the “but-for” cause of discrimination.298 This makes it
difficult for mentally ill employees to establish a prima facie case of
discrimination under the ADAAA.
293. Id. at 1220-21.
294. Id.
295. EEOC v. Picture People, Inc., 684 F.3d 981, 985.
296. See supra Part V.B.
297. See supra Part V.B.2.
298. See supra Part V.C.
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VI. Conclusion
The ADAAA specifically overturned four Supreme Court decisions
and broadened the ADA’s definition of disability. In doing so, the
ADAAA succeeded in refocusing Title I employment cases away from
the question of whether an employee is disabled to instead address the
question of whether the disabled employee suffered discrimination.
The expanded definition of disability has therefore removed one
significant hurdle and has greatly increased the likelihood that
mentally ill employees will have disability standing under the ADA.
However, this increase has had a larger impact on physically disabled
employees than on mentally disabled employees.
Additionally, the ADAAA failed to make other necessary
statutory amendments and many mentally ill employees continue to
have difficulty establishing a prima facie case of disability
discrimination under the ADA. Employees do not consistently fare
well under the second prong of the prima facie case of disability
discrimination with courts often finding that mentally ill employees
are not qualified and that the employer is not required to
accommodate them. Mentally ill employees also do not consistently
fare well under the adverse action or third prong of the prima facie
case both because courts may determine that the complained of
incident does not rise to the level of being an adverse action and
because the majority of courts have held that a claimant cannot bring
a “mixed motive” claim under the ADA.
The ADAAA does not apply retroactively to incidents that
occurred before 2009, and as a result, the case law is still developing.
However, based on the current case law, it appears that while the
ADAAA is a positive step for mentally ill employees, these employees
still face hurdles in establishing a prima facie case of discrimination
under the ADA.
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